Good morning,

Hope you have had a good week so far. This is the Thursday edition of The Intel Brief.
Let’s review some major updates.

Reporting Period: October 20-23, 2025

Bottom-Line Up Front:

Budapest Summit Between U.S., Russia Postponed

Summary
Reporting confirms that on October 21, 2025, the Budapest Summit between President Trump and President Putin remains postponed. The summit is postponed following a phone call between Secretary of State Rubio and Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov. There are no plans for a summit in the near future.

Findings

• Background: Trump and Putin spoke on the phone on October 16 to discuss trade and diplomatic relations in the event of a peace deal in Ukraine (BBC). On October 18, Trump hosted President Zelenskyy at the White House, where he urged Kiev to accept Russian demands to cede Donetsk and Luhansk to Moscow (WSJ).
  Following his call with Putin, and before hosting Zelenskyy, Trump stated that a high-level meeting was being coordinated in Budapest, Hungary (Instagram). Secretary Rubio is responsible for those plans.

• Rubio-Lavrov Call: Reporting on October 21, confirms that Secretary Rubio and Foreign Minister Lavrov held an initial phone call (NBC News, CNN). Following Rubio’s report to the president, Trump paused planning for the summit, believing “both sides in the Russia-Ukraine conflict were not ready to seriously talk peace” (NBC News).
  A Trump administration official told CNN that there are no plans for a summit between Trump and Putin “in the immediate future” (CNN).

Why This Matters
The postponement of the Budapest Summit is significant as it sidetracks peace efforts in Ukraine. Some would argue it displays an American foreign policy inconsistency, but it actually demonstrates the Trump administration’s realist approach to a peace deal; battlefield realities are compelling a decision point in Kyiv, and in Moscow a continued economic crisis is making the war more and more costly.

From the U.S. perspective, the administration does appear to be pursuing an end to the war, as evident by the Treasury’s new sanctions on Russia’s largest oil companies, Rosneft and Lukoil (U.S. Department of the Treasury).

Given the economic decline in Russia, the continued sanctions, and the frozen battlefield, we can consider Putin’s position as aggressive, but seeking an off-ramp.

Where there is an American foreign policy inconsistency is regarding aid to Ukraine. The PURL program with NATO appears to be popular in the Zelenskyy cabinet, but promises of Tomahawk missiles and long-range strike approvals, while clearly tools for negotiating and deterrence, reveal Washington’s intention to retain a restricted military aid position.

Finally, the point of ambiguity regarding “both sides” being unwilling for peace is a concern, as the Trump admin may feel Russia’s demands are aggressive while Ukraine’s demands are unrealistic.

Recap: U.S. Strikes On Vessels Transiting The Caribbean

Summary
As of October 22, the United States has conducted eight strikes on vessels transiting the Caribbean, believed to be for drug trafficking and of cartel origin. The strikes demonstrate the Trump administration’s growing focus and interest on the Southern Hemisphere, and in particular the United States’ historic sphere of influence. They also constitute escalations against regimes Washington deems undesirable, principally the Maduro regime in Venezuela, and the Petro presidency in Colombia.

Findings
Below is a timeline analysis of U.S. strikes on cartel vessels transiting Caribbean international waters:

• September 2: This was the first strike on an alleged cartel vessel. President Trump states the vessel was operated by Tren de Aragua members, a cartel designated on the Foreign Terrorist Organization list (The New York Times, U.S. Department of State). Eleven people were killed (The New York Times).

  • September 7: For the first time, President Trump suggests the United States may conduct strikes on targets inside Venezuela.

• September 15: A second strike is conducted on an unidentified vessel, killing “three male terrorists” (CBS News). Colombian President Gustavo Petro states one of the men was a fisherman, and the strike constitutes murder (CBS News).

• September 16: Colombia’s president claims a separate strike is conducted on another Colombian vessel. The occurrence and details of this strike are disputed.

• September 19: President Trump confirms that a third strike is conducted against a vessel “affiliated with a Designated Terrorist Organization,” killing three (AP News). Authorities from the Dominican Republic report that cocaine was recovered (The New York Times).

• October 3: Secretary of War Pete Hegseth announces that a fourth strike occurred off the coast of Venezuela, killing four “male narcoterrorists” (ABC News). Colombian President Petro claims the vessel was transporting Colombians (The New York Times).

• October 14: President Trump confirms a strike “just off the coast of Venezuela” killed six more traffickers (The New York Times). Families from Trinidad and Tobago stated their relatives were killed in the strike (The New York Times).

• October 16: President Trump confirms that a sixth strike targeted a semi-submersible vessel used for narcotics trafficking (BBC). Two were killed and two were captured, both of whom were repatriated to Colombia and Ecuador (BBC).

• October 17: Secretary Hegseth confirms that a seventh strike is conducted on a vessel linked to Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional, a Colombian Marxist terrorist organization, killing three (CBS News). This is the first strike conducted on a vessel, and of Colombian origin, after President Trump called President Petro an illegitimate ruler and ally of the cartels (CBS News).

• October 21: Secretary Hegseth confirms that an eighth vessel was struck, killing two (USNI News). This is the first vessel struck on the Eastern Pacific side of South America, and not in the Caribbean (USNI News).

Why This Matters
Continued strikes against cartel vessels in the region are almost certain to continue. It is also increasingly likely, given the strikes and Washington’s disdain for President Maduro, that military operations could expand to within Venezuela.

While the U.S. has a secondary goal of pressuring the governments it does not endorse, like Petro’s administration, the continued campaign against the cartels also serves as a means of mobilizing other governments or partners in the region. For example, Ecuadorian forces reportedly conducted strikes against the Los Lobos cartel at sites along the Colombian border.

Finally, from a legal standpoint, Washington needs to be careful with how it continues to prosecute these strikes. Trump could soon face pressure from Congress, and internationally, the strikes set a precedent that could embolden and legitimize similar behaviors abroad (i.e. Chinese incursions and provocation operations in the South China Sea).

Japanese Parliament Elects Sanae Takaichi As Prime Minister

Summary
On October 21, 2025, the Japanese Parliament elected Sanae Takaichi as prime minister. Takaichi was elected as head of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in early October. Takaichi is a conservative and ally of the deceased and former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. She is inheriting a fractured legislature, economic stagnation crisis, demographic decline, and heightened security tensions. The LDP’s lack of partners or seats majority means the new government could face legislative issues or an early exit.

Findings

• Background: Takaichi was elected as leader of the LDP on October 4, 2025, which led to the Komeito party leaving their longstanding (26 years) coalition (Time). The development left LDP with a plurality, but not a majority, of seats in the National Diet (Time). When Takaichi was confirmed as LDP leader, her chances of becoming the next prime minister became almost certain (CSIS).

• National Diet Vote: On October 21, the Japanese National Diet convened to elect a new prime minister (SOURCE). In the lower chamber, Takaichi won with 237 of 465 votes (ABC News, Time). In the upper chamber, Takaichi was one seat short of victory before securing her nomination in a runoff against the Constitutional Democratic Party (ABC News, Time).

• Takaichi Cabinet: Following her nomination as prime minister, Takaichi appointed rivals and veteran legislators to leadership roles:

  • Minoru Kihara as chief cabinet secretary

  • Toshimitsu Motegi as foreign minister

  • Shinjiro Koizumi as defense minister

  • Yoshimasa Hayashi as internal affairs and communication minister

  • Ryosei Akazawa as economy and trade minister

  • Satsuki Katayama as finance minister

  • Kimi Onoda as economic security minister

  • Midori Matsushima as aide to the prime minister

Why This Matters
The new Takaichi government is already making waves, mostly due to some factors regarding Takaichi’s intentions and her story:

• First female PM in Japan’s history

• Avid Shinzo Abe supporter and ally

• Promises of balancing reform and tradition

• Promises for rapid economic reform

• Promise to improve the U.S.-Japanese partnership to “new heights”

However, with the departure of the Komeito party from their coalition, and LDP’s plurality being retained by a deal with the Ishin no Kai party, there is a chance that an opposition coalition could form and create a majority. Additionally, without coalition allies, the LDP will have to work to court opposition MPs to pass legislation.

Takaichi, who has styled herself a Japanese “Iron Lady” (due to her admiration for the late Margaret Thatcher), will have to focus on building alliances in the Diet if she wants to avoid an early exit.

End Brief

That concludes this brief.

Thank you for reading!
— Nick