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Good morning,
This is the Thursday morning edition of The Intel Brief. Let’s begin.
Reporting Period: December 1-4, 2025
Bottom-Line Up Front:
1. On December 3, the NATO Foreign Ministers meeting convened in Brussels, Belgium. The officials likely discussed the Ukraine peace process, how the alliance can continue to support Ukraine into 2026, and what security for Ukraine could look like post-peace. Secretary of State Rubio did not attend the meeting.
2. On December 1, the United States Air Force awarded a new contract for the Stand-In Attack Weapon (SiAW). The contract was awarded to Northrop Grumman, with delivery of the missiles beginning in 2026.
3. On December 2, Steve Witkoff met with Putin in Russia to discuss peace conditions with Ukraine. At the same time, President Zelenskyy met with President Macron in France. Witkoff did not meet with Zelenskyy after his meeting in Russia, instead returning directly to Washington. A meeting between Trump and Zelenskyy, and European partners, is not confirmed.
4. This week, Georgia demanded that Russia withdraw troops in occupied breakaway regions in order to resume a diplomatic relationship. Russia rejected the demand, with one Georgian MP stating Russia’s interest is to control a Georgia “without Georgians” in it.
NATO Foreign Ministers Meeting Convenes
Summary
On December 3, the NATO Foreign Ministers meeting convened in Brussels, Belgium. The officials likely discussed the Ukraine peace process, how the alliance can continue to support Ukraine into 2026, and what security for Ukraine could look like post-peace. Secretary of State Rubio did not attend the meeting.
Findings
Foreign Ministers Meeting: On December 3, the Meeting of NATO Ministers of Foreign Affairs convened in Brussels, Belgium (NATO).
Agenda: At 0730 and 0800, ministers and Secretary General Rutte arrived and provided doorstep statements to the media (NATO). At 0900, a meeting of the North Atlantic Council convened, followed by the Foreign Ministers’ photograph at 1200 (NATO).
At 1245, the NATO-Ukraine Council convened for a working lunch (NATO).
The day was concluded with a press conference by Rutte (NATO).
Chinese Delegation in Moscow: Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi is in Moscow to meet with Foreign Minister Lavrov and Secretary of the Security Council of Russia, Sergei Shoigu (PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs). This bilateral meeting is convening at the same time as the NATO Ministers meeting, and follows a U.S. delegation’s departure from Moscow (see later brief).
Why This Matters
I think it is likely that the officials who convened in Brussels discussed the ongoing peace process regarding Ukraine, and how the alliance can support Kyiv on the battlefield, and what NATO’s position on security for Ukraine should look like if a peace deal is reached.
China’s presence in Moscow at this time is interesting, as it shows Russia and China have (or are at least capable of) deep strategic coordination. It is nearly certain that China is helping Russia develop its strategy for maneuvering through the peace talks to ensure maximalist gains and terms that can be coerced or skirted in the future.
Perhaps the biggest fallout from this event is Rubio’s decision to skip and remain in Washington. From a PR perspective, the decision supports the narrative that the U.S. is intentionally distancing itself from NATO and Europe.
USAF Awards Stand-In Attack Weapon Contract
Summary
On December 1, the United States Air Force awarded a new contract for the Stand-In Attack Weapon (SiAW). The contract was awarded to Northrop Grumman, with delivery of the missiles beginning in 2026.
Findings
Background: The Stand-In Attack Weapon (SiAW) is an air-to-surface missile designed to “defeat rapidly relocatable targets as part of an enemy’s anti-access/area denial environment” (Northrop Grumman). It is based on the Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile - Extended Range (AARGM-ER) used by the U.S. Navy (Sandboxx). The SiAW is compatible with the F-35A Lightning II and will expand the Air Force’s operational SEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses) capability (Gov Con Wire).
The missile is expected to be fielded in 2026 (Northrop Grumman).SiAW Contract: On December 1, reports confirm that Northrop Grumman has been awarded a $100 million contract to manufacture and deliver SiAW missiles to the U.S. Air Force (Gov Con Wire). The USAF intends to purchase anywhere from 400 to 3,000 SiAW missiles by 2028, totalling $8.4 billion (Gov Con Wire). Manufacturing will continue until December 31, 2034 (Gov Con Wire).
WOSA: The SiAW is one of the Air Force’s first programs being awarded under the new WOSA guidelines (AFRL). WOSA, or Weapon Open System Architecture, is a new framework for developing and procuring warfighting systems. It is intended to “break vendor lock” by standardizing interfaces and making them modular for future needs and upgrades (AFRL). In short, the SiAW should have some longevity to its operational lifecycle.
Why This Matters
The advancement of the SiAW program is a good thing. China has rapidly accelerated its procurement of advanced aircraft and missiles, so growing our anti-A2/AD capability is time-sensitive and essential.
The scale of procurement, which is upwards of 3,000 missiles, also shows the Pentagon is preparing for high-volume, sustained conflict rather than limited strikes. This aligns with broader concerns about munitions stockpiles, magazine depth, and the early-war demand curve for a war in the Indo-Pacific.
Ukraine Peace Talks, Meetings Fail To Reach Breakthrough
Summary
On December 2, Steve Witkoff met with Putin in Russia to discuss peace conditions with Ukraine. At the same time, President Zelenskyy met with President Macron in France. Witkoff did not meet with Zelenskyy after his meeting in Russia, instead returning directly to Washington. A meeting between Trump and Zelenskyy, and European partners, is not confirmed.
Findings
Background: On November 30, Secretary Rubio, alongside envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, hosted Rustem Umerov (Secretary of Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council) and his staff (Rapid Response).
Rubio seemingly praised the progress that was made, and said the meeting was about “ending the war” so that Ukraine can remain “independent and sovereign” and avoid a war with Russia in the future (Rapid Response).
Zelenskyy-Macron Meeting: On December 1, President Zelenskyy met with President Macron in Paris, France (RFI). Zelenskyy stated that his priorities remain focused on acquiring security guarantees from the U.S. and Europe, and maintaining Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity (The Guardian).
Zelenskyy stated he hopes to hold a phone call with President Trump following Witkoff’s return from Moscow (The Guardian).
Macron stated that his talk with Zelenskyy “could be a turning point” for peace in Ukraine and European security (RFI). Macron also stated that a peace deal can only be finalized with European input, due to the EU’s role in security guarantees, EU membership discussions, and the management of frozen Russian assets (RFI).
Witkoff in Russia: On December 2, Special Envoy Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner (President Trump’s son-in-law) met with President Putin in Moscow, Russia (The New York Times). On December 3, the Kremlin stated that despite talks being “very useful, constructive, and highly substantive,” a breakthrough was not reached (CNN).
Before the meeting, Putin stated it was taking place because Europe (the EU) is attempting to “completely block this peace process,” and that Russia is “not planning to fight with Europe” but is ready for conflict (The New York Times). Putin’s remarks are in response to reports that NATO is considering “proactive” military operations against Russia.
Zelenskyy Snubbed: President Zelenskyy expected to meet with Witkoff following the talks in France and Russia (CNN). However, it was reported that Witkoff and Kushner “promised” to return to Washington immediately from Russia, with Zelenskyy canceling a meeting in France to return to Kyiv (The Kyiv Post).
Why This Matters
The talks show Washington, Kyiv, Moscow, and Europe are not aligned on the basic end-state of the war. France wants a European-led settlement; Moscow wants to bypass Europe; the U.S. is pushing an uncharacteristic negotiation track; and Ukraine is still trying to secure guarantees that no one is ready to formalize. Those disparate interests create a risk of separate deals being explored in parallel, none of which may be durable.
Putin is using the process to test divisions between the U.S. and Europe while signaling he is open to negotiations that prioritize his terms. Zelenskyy being sidelined, intentionally or not, undercuts Ukraine’s position and signals Moscow that the West is struggling to coordinate its unaligned interests.
Ultimately, as combat operations continue into winter, the risk is that a peace deal will fall through or a bad one will be rushed, making for a fragmented settlement that leaves key security issues unresolved and sets ignorable conditions for future conflict.
Russia Rejects Conditions For Normal Diplomatic Relations With Georgia
Summary
This week, Georgia demanded that Russia withdraw troops in occupied breakaway regions in order to resume a diplomatic relationship. Russia rejected the demand, with one Georgian MP stating Russia’s interest is to control a Georgia “without Georgians” in it.
Findings
Background: On August 1, 2008, Russia invaded Georgia to support pro-Russian separatists in South Ossetia and Abkhazia (The Wall Street Journal). The regions were officially a part of Georgia since the fall of the USSR in 1991, but ethnic violence had led to de facto rule by Russian-backed separatists in those regions (DARC).
The war ended on August 16, 2008, with Georgia’s loss of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (The Wall Street Journal). Russia formally recognized each region’s sovereignty, but they remain under Russian occupation and control (Le Monde).
Georgian MP’s Demands: Georgian Public Broadcaster reported that Georgian Member of Parliament, Nikoloz Samkharadze, demanded Russia withdraw troops and return the Abkhazia and South Ossetia breakaway regions to Georgia (Georgian Public Broadcaster).
“The Georgian government has a firmly stated policy that until Georgia’s territories are de-occupied, until Russia withdraws its occupation forces from Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region, there will be no diplomatic relations or political dialogue with Russia whatsoever.”
Russia’s Statement: On December 3, the Russian Foreign Ministry rejected the opportunity to recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia as Georgian (Akmu). Russia, citing “the position advocated” by former Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili, has stated that its decision to recognize the regions’ autonomy is “irreversible” (Akmu, Georgian Public Broadcaster).
Georgian Response: A member of the opposition United National Movement party, Lasha Parulava, stated that despite the ruling Georgian Dream aligning with Moscow’s interests, the Kremlin’s goal is to bring Georgia “within its own strategic plan” and absorb a “Georgia without Georgians” (Georgian Public Broadcaster).
In October 2025, the ruling Georgian Dream party asked the Constitutional Court to ban the three largest opposition parties: Coalition for Change, United National Movement, and Strong Georgia-Lelo (RFE/RL).
Why This Matters
Russia’s decision to recognize the breakaway regions and reject diplomatic normalization with Georgia, alongside the Georgian MP’s warnings of Moscow’s intentions in the Caucasus, suggests that Georgia (a non-NATO member) could be the target of a future Russian “special military operation,” similar to Ukraine. That scenario would be more likely in the event of an opposition government taking over, as the Georgian Dream leadership makes a non-violent alignment (or absorption into Russia) a simpler, low-risk option for Moscow.
Georgian Dream’s election victory in early October marked a sharp turn away from pro-Western politics and policies, and totally uprooted Georgia’s EU accession progress. Georgian Dream could cleverly entertain NATO cooperation and bilateral relations with the United States (as we saw with joint military exercises) in order to deter Russian aggression while still aligning with Moscow. However, future elections or civil instability could oust Georgian Dream and, eventually, spur Russian intervention similar to the 2000s.
Georgia is simply a much more likely target for Russian aggression than Europe’s eastern periphery states.
End Brief
That concludes this brief.
Thank you for reading!
— Nick
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This publication is an Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) product and does not contain Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) or Classified Information.