Good morning,

This is the Thursday morning edition of The Intel Brief. Here are some critical geopolitical updates from the week so far.

Reporting Period: 4-7 August 2025

Bottom-Line Up Front:

Poland’s New President Takes Office

Summary
On 6 August, Karol Nawrocki was inaugurated as Poland’s new president. Despite various scandals and investigations, Nawrocki won the second round of presidential elections on 1 June 2025 with 50.89% of votes. Nawrocki is expected to retain much of President Duda’s policy pursuits, as well as clash with Prime Minister Tusk.

Findings

• Background: Presidential elections were held in Poland on 18 May 2025, but when no candidate received a majority vote, a second round was held on 1 June. Nawrocki beat Warsaw Mayor Trzaskowski for the presidency.

• Profile: Nawrocki is a controversial figure in Polish politics. POLITICO outlined various controversies that were used against him during his campaign, such as:

  • Using an alter ego to promote his book about organized crime in Poland in 2018.

  • Fraud charges regarding the transfer of ownership of an apartment building in Gdansk, Poland, between 2012 and 2017.

  • Arranging prostitutes for clients when working as a resort security guard.

  Prime Minister Tusk previously used these allegations against Nawrocki during his campaign, and former President Wałęsa stated he will not attend Nawrocki’s inauguration, both indicating the new president may struggle to unite the Polish government and a new Council of Ministers.

• Polish Government: Poland’s national government is a unitary semi-presidential republic (i.e. parliamentary republic) that is established by a constitution.
  Like many parliamentary systems in Europe, the powers of the President and Prime Minister are prone to great cooperation or great infighting.

• Nawrocki Agenda: Nawrocki is expected to carry forward President Duda’s policy agenda, which has included defense modernization and expansion, support for Ukraine, immigration control, EU skepticism, and cultural and economic conservatism.
  It is uncertain what Nawrocki’s presidency will mean for Poland’s domestic politics, as he and Prime Minister Tusk have clashed ideologically. Nawrocki’s scandals, which he has legal immunity from, may also lead to public discord and further political polarization.

Why This Matters
Nawrocki’s inauguration is a divisive topic in Poland and the European Union. Proponents of Nawrocki suggest he will continue to be a cultural, economic, and security bulwark by supporting centrist national policies (such as support for Ukraine and military modernization) while using his presidency to further promote traditional and conservative values in Poland (like those related to immigration).

Critics of Nawrocki view him as a corrupt nationalist who will further divide Poland’s political split and grow support for anti-EU and anti-NATO sentiment, and that in doing so, will pursue bilateralism with the Trump administration.

Sources: Atlantic Council, POLITICO, Government of Poland

Iran Establishes Supreme National Defense Council, First Time Since 1980s

Summary
On 4 August, the IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News stated the Supreme National Defense Council (SNDC) has been reestablished. The move effectively brings Iran’s military planning, cooperation, intelligence, and operational authority under one command. The SNDC’s resurgence was organized under the authority of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council (SNSC).

Findings

• Background: The SNDC has not been organized in a significant operational capacity since the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988). Legally, the SNDC functions under Article 176 of Iran’s constitution. Article 176 establishes the SNSC, defense and security policies, and establishes the authorities that oversee the use of resources for these purposes.

• Purpose: By pre-establishing the SNDC before a crisis or war, Iran is able to subvert the required consensus within the SNSC. Iran International also suggests that the establishment of the Defense Council allows for the survivability of Iran’s leadership and decreases the vulnerability of decapitation strikes.

• Organization: The Defense Council will be chaired by President Pezeshkian. He is very likely to be joined by:

  • Chief Justice Ghloam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’i (current Head of Judiciary)

  • Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf (current Head of the Islamic Parliament of Iran)

  • Minister Esmaeil Khatib (current Minister of Intelligence)

  • Major General Abdolrahim Mousavi (current Chief of Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces)

  • Two SNSC representatives appointed by the Supreme Leader

  The Defense Council is permanently staffed by top Iranian army commanders, IRGC leadership, and the staff of the Khatam-al-Anbia Central Headquarters.

Why This Matters
The establishment of the SNDC under the Supreme National Security Council indicates three clear strategic priorities for Iran:

• Organizing a centralized military decision-making body that can coordinate joint operations and intelligence.

• Restructure Iran’s military disposition in preparation for future conflict.

• Ensure a central decision-making body exists in the event of Supreme Leader Khamenei’s death.

This indicates Iran is preparing for future hostilities, likely with the United States and Israel. If that is true, then it also suggests Iran does not intend to make concessions on issues that prompted U.S.-Israeli intervention: Reaching a nuclear agreement with the U.S. and Europe, and Tehran’s funding, organization, and support for terrorist proxies in the region.

Sources: ABC News, Iran International, The Jerusalem Post, Constitute Project

Russia Formally Withdraws From Cold War-Era INF Treaty

Summary
On 4 August, the Russian Foreign Ministry declared it has formally withdrawn from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty). Moscow’s decision was prompted by the United States’ deployment of nuclear-capable submarines to the region, but Russia did not elaborate on its own violations of the treaty.

Findings

• Background: The INF Treaty was initially signed by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev (USSR) in December 1987. After U.S. Senate approval, the treaty was ratified and became law in June 1988.
  In October 2018, during his first term, President Trump announced the U.S. would withdraw from the INF Treaty due to Russian non-compliance (which overlapped with the Obama administration) and China’s missile build-up in the Indo-Pacific.
  The U.S. formally withdrew from the INF Treaty in August 2019.
  During the Cold War, the treaty was considered a monumental diplomatic breakthrough in nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament, as it restricted the development and deployment of ground-based IRBMs, eliminated nearly 2,700 IRBMs from arsenals, and coordinated bilateral on-site inspections.

• Russia’s Withdrawal: On 4 August, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation announced Moscow’s withdrawal from the INF Treaty. The statement cited various violations of the treaty via weapons development (such as the M142 HIMARS rocket artillery system) and the deployment of such systems to Europe and the Asia-Pacific region.
  Russia did not mention its own weapons development projects, violations during the Obama presidency and the first Trump presidency, or its use of an Oreshnik IRBM in Ukraine.

Why This Matters
Russia’s withdrawal from the INF Treaty is mostly symbolic; a gesture intended to depict the U.S. and Trump’s deployment of nuclear-capable submarines as an unnecessary aggression and unfair tool of diplomatic coercion.

The reality is, long-term Russian non-compliance and growing threats—such as China’s PLA Rocket Force—forced the United States to reassess the validity and continuity of the INF Treaty.

While not abiding by the treaty, Russia claimed to be “self-restricting” itself. It is possible that Russia’s withdrawal is also being used to set up a new, landmark revision to the treaty should a ceasefire in Ukraine eventually be reached. In other words, another item to the list of ways to “normalize” Russo-U.S. relations following the conclusion of Russia’s “Special Military Operation.”

Bottom Line: Russia’s withdrawal is intended to degrade U.S. soft power and possibly incentivize future diplomatic normalization with Washington and the West.

Sources: Newsweek, The New York Times, Reuters, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation

Top U.S. Diplomat Meets With Putin Ahead Of Ceasefire Deadline

Summary
On 5 August, the Kremlin confirmed that President Putin and U.S. Special Envoy Witkoff met in Moscow. The Kremlin called the meeting “constructive and useful.” The meeting precedes the Friday, 8 August, ceasefire deadline imposed on Russia by President Trump. It is uncertain what was discussed, if President Trump will extend the deadline, or if further such meetings will occur.

Findings

• Putin-Witkoff Meeting: The Kremlin stated it would not release details of the talks between Putin and Witkoff until President Trump and his cabinet were debriefed. The Kremlin stated the talks lasted nearly 3 hours, and that Putin conveyed “signals” on Ukraine and that “corresponding signals” from President Trump were relayed. This indicates that core interests and expectations for a ceasefire and future negotiations have been addressed.
  Kremlin Spokesperson Peskov told TASS News Agency that it will take time for Russo-U.S. relations to get “back onto a normal track.”

• Future Meeting: On 6 August, The New York Times reported that President Trump is planning to meet with Putin as early as next week.

Despite the apparently constructive engagement between Putin and Witkoff, various developments suggest Russia, Ukraine, and the United States are far from reaching a ceasefire deal:

• Russian Drone and Missile Attacks: On 6 August, BBC reported that since President Trump’s inauguration, Russia has doubled the number of drone and missile attacks on Ukraine. BBC Verify reports that nearly 27,158 munitions have been launched against Ukraine between 20 January and 19 July.

• Russian Ground Offensives: Across the 600-mile frontline in Ukraine, ABC News reports that Russia is committing resources to offensive operations against three key regions:

  • Northeast Sumy, Sumy Oblast

  • Pokrovsk, Donetsk Oblast

  • Kostyantynivka, Donetsk Oblast

• NATO Aid Efforts: On 5 August, NATO announced that Denmark, Norway, and Sweden had committed to a $500 million military aid package for Ukraine. At the same time, NATO has begun coordinating the deliveries of air defense equipment and ammunition, which is backed by President Trump’s buy-to-donate aid concept.

Why This Matters
The Putin-Witkoff meeting is interesting because it is very difficult to gauge its effectiveness. It is very unlikely that the talks led to a breakthrough regarding a ceasefire in Ukraine due to Russia’s continued offensive operations and perpetual NATO support.

Additionally, the talks are unlikely to have made major strides towards a ceasefire because to date, Russian negotiations regarding the subject have been conducted to confuse and degrade Ukrainian efforts and increase Russia’s diplomatic prestige. They have also been used as tools for Moscow to create pro-peace narratives despite increased recruitment, defense spending, and offensive operational frequency. The only exception to this trend is that Putin himself engaged in the meeting with Witkoff, making it the highest-level negotiation on the subject to date.

It is likely that President Trump will implement the planned economic sanctions on Russia following the ceasefire deadline’s expiration on Friday, 8 August. Trump is likely to continue threatening economic sanctions and tariffs on Russia and its partners (like India) to pressure negotiations.

Sources: CNN, BBC, ABC News, NATO, AP News, Yahoo

End Brief

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— Nick