Thursday Morning Brief (30 June - 3 July 2025)

The EU's 18th sanction package on Russia stalls, the IAEA assesses Iran's nuclear program, and the U.S. and India pursue deeper defense cooperation.

Curated foreign policy and national security news for professionals.

Good morning,

This is the Thursday morning edition of The Intel Brief. Before you start your Independence Day weekend, here are your critical updates from this week in geopolitics.

Reporting Period: 30 June - 3 July 2025

Bottom-Line Up Front:

1. The IAEA Inspector General stated that Iran’s nuclear program could resume in “months,” and that its 900-pound stockpile of enriched uranium was likely moved before U.S. strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities. Iranian officials have suggested the strikes were less effective than the Trump administration claims. Iran is reportedly open to diplomacy, but will not negotiate issues it deems as national policy protected by international law.

2. On 29 June, Russia launched its largest combined drone and missile strike on Ukraine since the war began. This unprecedented air assault, paired with a new ground offensive targeting Sumy and growing domestic pressures within Russia, suggests the Kremlin is attempting to coerce Ukraine into peace negotiations on Moscow’s terms. With economic and military concerns domestically, Russia appears to be embracing effective, low-cost platforms to force Kyiv into a strategically disadvantageous ceasefire or settlement.

3. The EU Commission’s 18th sanctions package against Russia has stalled due to opposition from Hungary and Slovakia, despite broad support from other EU member states. The package aims to tighten economic pressure on Russia’s defense and energy sectors in response to its continued war in Ukraine. While Germany and other key players remain optimistic about final adoption, the delay underscores deepening fractures in EU consensus and threatens to undermine the bloc’s credibility and strategic unity.

4. On 1 July, Secretary of Defense Hegseth hosted Indian External Affairs Minister Jaishankar at the Pentagon. The pair discussed details for a forthcoming 10-year defense framework aimed at improving bilateral military cooperation. The proposed agreement would expand defense sales, joint defense production initiatives, and interoperability between U.S. and Indian forces.

IAEA States Iranian Nuclear Program Is Severely Damaged, Not “Obliterated”

Summary
The IAEA Inspector General stated that Iran’s nuclear program could resume in “months,” and that its 900-pound stockpile of enriched uranium was likely moved before U.S. strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities. Iranian officials have suggested the strikes were less effective than the Trump administration claims. Iran is reportedly open to diplomacy, but will not negotiate issues it deems as national policy protected by international law.

Findings

  • Background: On 21 June, the United States conducted Operation Midnight Hammer. The operation included the bombing of Iran’s 3 nuclear facilities following a week of Israeli attacks. Despite conflicting reports from media and early intelligence assessments, the Trump administration has maintained that the strikes had “obliterated” Iran’s nuclear program and set back any efforts by “years.”

  • IAEA Interview: In an interview with CBS News, IAEA Inspector General Grossi stated that Operation Midnight Hammer resulted in “severe damage” but not “total damage” to Iran’s nuclear program. When questioned on whether or not Iran moved 900 pounds of highly enriched uranium, Grossi stated they were likely moved. The location of Iran’s near-weapons-grade uranium remains uncertain to Grossi and the IAEA.

    Based on uranium stockpiles, industrial capabilities, and scientific progress, Grossi suggests that Iran could rebuild facilities and resume its nuclear program “in a matter of months,” but is relative to capacity.

  • Iranian Response: Iran’s Supreme Leader and other senior officials have vowed retaliation, downplayed the damage to its nuclear facilities, and suggested a diplomatic solution to Iranian nuclearization is not possible.
    On 29 June, the Iranian Ambassador to the UN stated Iran’s nuclear program “will never stop.” He stated that Iran is ready for negotiations, but that dictating Iran’s national policy goals is non-negotiable.

Why This Matters
The International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) assessment injects strategic ambiguity into the aftermath of Operation Midnight Hammer, undermining U.S. claims that Iran's nuclear program was "obliterated." The IAEA’s revelation that 900 pounds of enriched uranium were likely relocated before the strikes raises critical concerns about Iran’s actual breakout timeline.

Iran’s ability to reconstitute its nuclear capabilities within months suggests that the window for non-proliferation diplomacy may be rapidly closing. Tehran’s refusal to negotiate over issues it views as sovereign—particularly uranium enrichment—further narrows the prospect of a peaceful resolution.

These factors, paired with Iran’s vows for retaliation (either directly or through proxies), suggest future strikes by the United States and Israel are likely.

Russian Strikes Indicate Moscow’s Desire To Force Ukraine Into An Unfavorable Peace

Summary
On June 29, Russia launched its largest combined drone and missile strike on Ukraine since the war began. This unprecedented air assault, paired with a new ground offensive targeting Sumy and growing domestic pressures within Russia, suggests the Kremlin is attempting to coerce Ukraine into peace negotiations on Moscow’s terms. With economic and military concerns domestically, Russia appears to be embracing effective, low-cost platforms to force Kyiv into a strategically disadvantageous ceasefire or settlement.

Findings

  • Putin’s Peace Deal Remarks: On 27 June, before the attack, President Putin expressed a desire to resume direct peace talks in Istanbul, Turkey.
    Previous negotiations only resulted in prisoner exchanges, with Russia not accepting Ukraine’s ceasefire offers.

  • Russia’s Recent Strike: On 29 June, Ukraine’s Air Force reported that Russia had fired 477 drones and 60 missiles into Ukraine. Based on size, this was Russia’s largest attack of this type since the war began. Ukraine’s Air Force claims that 475 of the drones were shot down or lost.
    Ukrainian defense industrial facilities and oil refineries were targeted in the attack, indicating Russia’s desire to destroy Ukraine’s key infrastructure.

    • Sumy Offensive: On 29 June, Russia reportedly committed 50,000 troops to an offensive, encircling Sumy, Ukraine. The new offensive was spurred by Russia’s reclamation of its Kursk Oblast from Ukraine.

  • Russian Domestic Constraints: The strikes, in addition to various domestic issues, suggest Russia is looking to pressure Ukraine into an unfavorable peace deal:

    • Economy: Russia’s Economic Minister recently stated that the nation is on the verge of recession. Russian economic data previously suggested growth due to lowering unemployment and economic output, but those numbers actually covered high inflation, worker shortages, and economic decline due to the war effort (i.e. lots of output on things being destroyed, expended, or captured on the battlefield).

    • FY26 Defense Budget: On 27 June, Putin announced that Russia would be reducing its defense budget for 2026, citing a need to support economic development and domestic recovery efforts.

    • Veterans and Mobilization: Last week, the Kremlin stated that it is struggling to reintegrate more than 140,000 veterans into civilian life, a number that is likely to increase if the war ends or scales down.

  • Ukrainian Drone Strike: On 1 July, social media began reporting that Ukraine conducted a strike on Russia’s Kupol drone and air defense facility some 1,300km from Ukraine. This indicates Ukraine’s desire to cripple Moscow’s supply of stand-off munitions and weapons systems.

Why This Matters
Given all this information, how exactly do those issues suggest Russia is trying to coerce or pressure Ukraine into an unfavorable peace deal? Let’s look at the strategy being employed on the battlefield.

For some time now, Russia has committed to large-scale ground offensives to capture symbolic or regionally relevant towns or cities. The current case is Sumy, following the expulsion of Ukrainian soldiers from Kursk earlier this year. Those offensives are made possible by two things:

  • Ukraine’s low manpower (which allows Russia to hold its occupied territories)

  • Russia’s high-volume of one-way munitions

As Russia pours its superior numbers into strategically relevant territories, it is using cheap one-way attack munitions to weaken Ukraine’s supply chain, destroy its support infrastructure, and lower civilian morale to pressure the Zelenskyy administration towards peace.

The domestic issues in Russia, and the responses we have seen as a result, indicate that Kremlin decision-makers think they can sustain this type of warfare. If truly sustainable, these operations could pressure a favorable peace deal by making Kyiv’s defensive posture untenable (due to low manpower, dwindling munitions, etc.).

There is also some indication that NATO’s boost in defense spending and member cooperation have startled Moscow. For example, Norway’s deployment of fighter aircraft to Poland, the building of a minefield in the Baltics, and Germany’s permanent deployment in Eastern Europe all suggest Moscow will need to deploy (and rebuild) its military as a deterrent.

EU’s 18th Sanctions Package On Russia Stalls

Summary
The European Commission’s proposed 18th sanctions package against Russia has stalled due to opposition from Hungary and Slovakia, despite broad support from other EU member states. The package aims to tighten economic pressure on Russia’s defense and energy sectors in response to its continued war in Ukraine. While Germany and other key players remain optimistic about final adoption, the delay underscores deepening fractures in EU consensus and threatens to undermine the bloc’s credibility and strategic unity.

Findings

  • 18th Sanctions Package: Proposed on 10 June, the EU Commission’s 18th sanctions package includes targeted measures against Russia’s military-industrial base, financial institutions, and energy exports. It is designed to close loopholes from previous packages and further degrade Russia’s ability to sustain its war against Ukraine through legal and illicit means.

  • Opposition from Hungary and Slovakia: Hungary and Slovakia blocked approval of the package during a key vote by EU ambassadors. Both countries cited economic concerns tied to the EU’s REPowerEU energy transition plan and their reliance on Russian fossil fuels.

  • Unanimity Requirement: EU sanctions require unanimous approval from all 27 member states, giving any one country effective veto power. This procedural rule continues to complicate EU foreign policy.

  • Leverage: Hungary and Slovakia are using their veto as leverage to extract concessions on energy funding and exemptions, arguing that the sanctions disproportionately harm their economies.
    Both countries received more than 2/3 of their energy supply from Russia, with both also having operated much of Europe’s refineries for export.

  • Ongoing Negotiations: Germany expects a deal “within the week,” with further talks aimed at resolving objections from Slovakia and Hungary. Commission officials are reportedly engaging in bilateral discussions to secure support for the sanctions package.

Why This Matters
The EU Commission’s failure to adopt the 18th sanctions package shows the deep fractures within the EU; a rift between Brussels and the bloc’s big players (Germany, France, Italy) and the culturally and economically disparate eastern member states.

While summed up as adversarial and pro-Russian, Slovakia and Hungary’s division is actually representative of a supranationlist EU that attempts to move with ununified speed and direction on policy.

That being said, Hungary and Slovakia’s use of veto power to delay a broadly supported initiative exposes the vulnerability of EU foreign policy under the unanimity rule. These delays directly benefit Russia by allowing continued access to financial and energy resources that support its war effort in Ukraine, the results of which dictate future peace negotiations.

U.S., India Pursue 10-Year Defense Framework

Summary
On 1 July, Secretary of Defense Hegseth hosted Indian External Affairs Minister Jaishankar at the Pentagon. The pair discussed details for a forthcoming 10-year defense framework aimed at improving bilateral military cooperation. The proposed agreement would expand defense sales, joint defense production initiatives, and interoperability between U.S. and Indian forces.

Findings

  • Framework Objectives: The new defense framework is designed to expand the U.S.–India Major Defense Partnership, emphasizing joint training, exercises, and operations across various domains, including air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace.

  • Strategic Alignment: Both nations aim to strengthen their strategic partnership to address common security challenges, particularly those arising from China's growing influence in the Indo-Pacific region and the recent conflict between India and Pakistan.

  • Defense Sales and Co-Production: The framework anticipates the completion of several major military sales to India and the expansion of shared defense industrial cooperation and co-production efforts.

Why This Matters
The establishment of a 10-year defense framework signifies a deepening of the U.S.–India strategic partnership, reflecting mutual concerns over regional security dynamics, particularly in the Indo-Pacific.

By formalizing defense cooperation, both nations aim to enhance their collective ability to address emerging security threats, promote stability in the region, and counterbalance China's assertive policies.

The strong bilateral relations between the U.S. and India is also very likely to convince India to undertake a growing role in “The Quad,” the U.S.-led partnership operating in the Pacific, which includes Australia and Japan.

End Brief

That concludes this brief. Thank you for being a valued subscriber!

Have a Happy Fourth of July!

— Nick

This publication is an Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) product and does not contain Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) or Classified Information.