Thursday Morning Brief (25-28 August 2025)

Iranian and European nuclear negotiations fall short again, no talks are scheduled between Ukraine and Russia, and the EU confirmed the date for its annual State of the Union address.

Curated foreign policy and national security news for professionals.

Good morning,

Let’s review the major geopolitical developments from this week (so far)!

Reporting Period: 25-28 August 2025

Bottom-Line Up Front:

1. The European Union has confirmed the date for the annual State of the Union (SOTEU) address. EU Commission President von der Leyen will address Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) on 10 September. A debate will follow.

2. American and European officials stated that efforts to coordinate a peace deal in Ukraine are ongoing. Despite efforts to organize a bilateral meeting between Putin and Zelenskyy, no negotiations have been scheduled. Various battlefield and diplomatic developments suggest the peace process is stalled.

3. Representatives from Iran and the E3 countries met in Turkey for nuclear talks. An agreement was not reached, so European leaders have to decide if they will implement “snapback” sanctions on Iran due to noncomliance with the terms of the 2015 Iran Nuclear Deal.

EU Confirms Date For State Of The Union Address

Summary
On 10 September, the European Parliament will convene for the EU State of the Union address (SOTEU). EU Commission President von der Leyen will address the parliament before the commencement of a policy debate.

Findings

  • Background: When the Lisbon Treaty was ratified in the European Union in 2009, it instituted an annual State of the Union address to improve policy transparency and promote democratic values in the EU.
    This year, President von der Leyen’s State of the Union speech will be the first of her second term, increasing the likelihood of major policy focuses being announced.

  • SOTEU: The agenda for the State of the Union is simple—highlight victories from the year, readdress concurrent policy priorities, and announce new ones. At the conclusion of SOTEU, Members of the European Parliaments (MEPs) will convene for a debate on the policy trajectory of the EU.

  • Agenda Items: While no official agenda items have been released, it is likely that von der Leyen will address some core areas:

    • European economies, innovation, and trade (especially with the United States and other rising markets, like China or South America)

    • Energy, and the EU’s plan to move away from Russian imports

    • Security and the ReARM Europe plan (AKA Readiness 2030), as well as support for Ukraine

    • Crisis preparation, both for natural disasters, humanitarian crises, cyber and space disasters, or regional conflict

    • EU expansion efforts (which has included the Balkans and the Caucasus)

Why This Matters
There isn’t really any evidence to suggest that the EU’s State of the Union is one of the year’s critical geopolitical events, but it does help define the EU’s trajectory. It is also an opportunity to show where the group diverges on policy matters, which is why the MEP debate is equally important.

The debate is where the path to legislation begins, whereas the SOTEU speech is more symbolic, an opportunity for von der Leyen to posture and promote the organization’s soft power.

Obstacles To Peace: Russia-Ukraine Peace Negotiations Stall Despite Western Unity, Alignment

Summary
On 25 August, Secretary of State Rubio issued a statement stating that the U.S. and European allies have continued to push for a diplomatic end to the war in Ukraine. Various developments, such as aid to Ukraine, drone and missile strikes, ground offensives, and Russian demands, suggest that diplomatic progress will continue to slow without high-level intervention.

Findings

  • Rubio’s Call With Counterparts: On 25 August, Secretary Rubio stated he held a call with his counterparts from Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Poland, the United Kingdom, Ukraine, and the European Union. No details were shared with the public, but that all parties “agreed to continue cooperation in diplomatic efforts to bring the Russia-Ukraine war to an end through a lasting negotiated settlement.”

  • Trump’s Position: On 26 August, President Trump expressed his dissatisfaction with Putin and Russia, stating he was “very angry” that progress had not been made. Trump recently reinstated the threat of sanctions on Russia if a deal is not made.
    Reuters also reported that during the Alaska Summit between Putin and Trump, officials discussed various energy deals that could be reached if a peace agreement is made. Used to incentivize a peace deal, Reuters reported that Exxon Mobil may rejoin the Sakhalin-1 project, Russia may “purchase U.S. equipment,” and sanctions on Moscow would be lifted.
    This is in line with previous estimates by The Intel Brief that Russia’s interests are to reform bilateral relations with the U.S. and, ultimately, retain an economic and diplomatic posture in the West, and that those interests may supersede the desire for peace in Ukraine.

  • Missiles to Ukraine: The United States has approved the sale of 3,350 Extended Range Attack Munitions (ERAMs) to Ukraine. The missiles have an operational range of 280 miles, with deliveries beginning in late September or early October.
    As of 24 August, the Trump administration still bars Ukraine from conducting long-range strikes into Russia with ATACMS missiles. Reporting suggests the U.S. will apply the same guidance to the ERAMs to incentivize a peace deal.

  • Russian Demands: Last week, speaking to Meet the Press, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov stated Russia’s demands for a Putin-Zelenskyy meeting to occur. Those demands have remained relatively consistent:

    • No NATO accession for Ukraine

    • Ukrainian demilitarization and neutrality

    • Russian acquisition of the Donbas oblast

    • UN Security Council (of which Russia is a member) provides security guarantees to Ukraine
      Zelenskyy and European leaders have suggested Russia does not have a serious interest in reaching a peace deal. Lavrov characterized Zelenskyy as an illegitimate but de facto leader of Ukraine, suggesting a peace deal could not be signed between him and Putin.

  • The Battlefield: In addition to Russia’s drone and missile barrages growing in scale and frequency, Ukraine admitted that Russian troops have entered the key Dnipropetrovsk region, indicating Russian ground offensives, while slow and costly, are continuing to be successful.

Why This Matters
There are a lot of variables getting in the way of a bilateral meeting between Putin and Zelenskyy, most notably the continued battlefield developments and Russia’s diplomatic pursuits that come as a result of entertaining peace in Ukraine (i.e. direct negotiations with the U.S. and improved bilateral access with its allies, like China).

It is my estimate that as American, European, and Ukrainian officials continue to coordinate diplomatic efforts, and as Russia refines its demands and continues to delay, Putin will exceed Trump’s new deadline and push for a trilateral meeting. The best chance Zelenskyy has of getting to a negotiating table with Putin is if Trump accompanies him; the biggest threat to that occurring (because Russia doesn’t want it) is European leaders looking to tag along.

EU, Iranian Diplomats Met For Nuclear Talks Ahead Of Sanctions Deadline

Summary
On 26 August, representatives from Iran and the E3 countries met in Turkey to discuss a nuclear deal before “snapback” sanctions are triggered. IAEA inspectors have not been to Iran’s facilities since the United States conducted Operation Midnight Hammer, and Tehran’s stockpile of enriched uranium remains unaccounted for.

Findings

  • Background: On 18 October, UN Security Council Resolution 2231 will expire, thereby implementing “snapback” sanctions on Iran due to noncompliance with the terms of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (AKA the Iran Nuclear Deal). The E3 states (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) have been pushing for Iran to agree to new terms that will limit or halt its nuclear program and allow for compliance inspections.

  • Nuclear Talks: On 25 July, Iranian and E3 officials held talks in Istanbul, Turkey, but did not yield an agreement. The 26 August session also failed to yield a new agreement. Reuters reported that the E3 nations are deciding on whether they will implement the snapback sanctions this month.
    Iran’s Crown Prince in exile, Reza Pahlavi, has advocated for the E3 to implement the sanctions, as has the American Jewish Committee, for example.

  • Multipolar Proposal: Iran’s other multipolar allies, Russia and China, proposed extending the 2015 JCPOA for another six months. The plan would offer Tehran an opportunity to avoid sanctions while, realistically, curtailing IAEA inspections.
    Iran persistently violated the terms of the 2015 Iran Nuclear Deal, with IAEA reports confirming the violations. Russia and China proposed the idea through their UN Security Council membership, which could lead to a voting resolution at the upcoming UN General Assembly in September.

Why This Matters
Legacy media will tell you that the danger of a deal not being reached is that Iran will run rampant with their nuclear program and push towards the construction of a nuclear arsenal, but there is no evidence to suggest that Tehran would even adhere to a new deal or a revision of the 2015 JCPOA.

UN inspections via the IAEA already showed that Iran has no intention of honoring the terms of a nuclear agreement, which brings us to the real issue: the potential for hostilities.

If Iran continues to rebuild its nuclear program and pursue weapons-grade uranium enrichment, then the United States, Israel, and European allies may feel prompted to strike Iran’s nuclear and military facilities in a similar fashion to Operation Midnight Hammer.

This is the real issue, especially since Supreme Leader Khamenei stated Iran and its officials will not, under any circumstances, negotiate and make a deal with the United States. This implies hostilities, whether directly or by proxy, will continue so long as the United States stands firm on its belief that Iran cannot obtain nuclear weapons.

End Brief

That concludes this brief.

Thank you for reading!
— Nick

This publication is an Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) product and does not contain Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) or Classified Information.