Good morning,

Happy Thursday and welcome to another edition of The Intel Brief (premium)!
Here are the major events from this week.

Reporting Period: 14-17 July 2025

Bottom-Line Up Front:

President Trump Promises Ukraine Aid, New Russian Sanctions If Peace Deal Is Not Reached

Summary
On 14 July, President Trump hosted NATO Secretary-General Rutte at the White House. The pair announced a new military aid plan for Ukraine, which includes European NATO members purchasing American weapons and donating them to Ukraine. Trump also outlined Washington’s intent to impose 100% tariffs on Russia if it fails to reach a peace deal in 50 days.

Findings
Let’s review what Trump and Rutte discussed in front of reporters inside the Oval Office:

• Purchase-for-Donation Aid: Trump and Rutte confirmed that the U.S. will sell military equipment to European NATO members for donation to Ukraine. The sale and distribution of systems is unclear, but will be coordinated by Ambassador Whitaker. The U.S. may use a “backfilling” strategy whereby allies send Ukraine equipment they already own, with the U.S. delivering replacements at a later date.
  Ukraine has a dire need for air defense systems and munitions, with Zelenskyy specifically requesting more Patriot air defense launchers.
  Trump has not ruled out the sale of “long-range missiles,” which would allow Ukraine to strike Moscow or Saint Petersburg.

• Dealing with Putin: Trump stated his dissatisfaction with Putin, and stated that if the Kremlin does not reach a peace deal in 50 days, the U.S. will impose 100% tariffs on Russia.
  Trump voiced his frustration at Russia’s indiscriminate bombing of Ukrainian cities and infrastructure.

• Warfighter Readiness: The Pentagon originally halted aid due to audits of U.S. munitions stockpiles and an assessment of defense industrial procurement, an assessment that is ongoing.
  The U.S. Army recently announced that it will stand up four new Patriot battalions due to air defense being the Army’s “most stressed force element.”
  This indicates the U.S. is likely to struggle in procuring replacements for Europe, or new systems for Ukraine.

Why This Matters
Trump’s new policy — a reversal of the Pentagon’s early-July decision to pause military aid to Ukraine — is likely to be framed as a “win-win” for Trump’s foreign policy agenda. Trump ran on an “America First” platform, but with NATO paying for Ukrainian weapons, he is likely to argue the U.S. is not contributing at a net loss (despite the stockpiling and warfighter readiness argument). From an outward perspective, continued American aid to Ukraine shows European NATO allies (and allies in the Pacific) that the U.S. does not abandon its allies and strategic goals.

If Trump’s administration can rapidly deliver on weapons shipments, then the new plan is likely to recoup American soft power and foreign policy continuity.

As for the 50-day ultimatum placed on Russia, there is no certainty whether or not Putin and the Kremlin will scramble to make a peace deal. Putin still wants a deal that addresses “root causes” behind the conflict, with big ticket items being:

• No Ukrainian NATO accession

• Ukrainian demilitarization

• Moscow’s formal acquisition of occupied Ukrainian territory

• Establishment of a buffer zone between Ukraine and Russia

However, Russia’s worsening economy and high war costs may pressure Putin to send serious diplomats to future negotiations. Right now, it appears as if the Kremlin believes it can continue to wage a frozen war through two main strategies:

• Concentrated ground offensives on key Ukrainian towns, cities, and terrain

• Consistent barrages of foreign-supplied drones and missiles on Ukrainian infrastructure

Sources: YouTube (The White House), NBC News, CBS News, NPR, Fox Business, CBS News, TWZ

Developments In The Caucasus Challenge Russia’s Influence Over The Region

Summary
On 15 July, Armenian President Pashinyan announced that peace negotiations with Azerbaijan regarding the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh have progressed. U.S Ambassador to Turkey, Tom Barrack, has offered American oversight of the Zangeur Corridor to help progress negotiations. In Chechnya, leader and Putin ally Ramzan Kadyrov is reportedly severely ill. Continued pressure from the war in Ukraine, Armenia’s rejection of Moscow’s influence, and growing Islamic separatism in Chechnya suggest Russia may be losing control of the Caucasus region.

Findings

• Background: The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has been waged on and off between Armenia and Azerbaijan for decades. The region experienced the expulsion of ethic Azeris in the 1990s. The region was previously controlled by the Republic of Artsakh, and until 2023, was mostly ethnic Armenian.
  The region was under “low-intensity conflict” from 2020 to 2023, when an Azerbaijani offensive (backed by Turkish support and drone technology) secured Azerbaijan’s control of the region.
  Pashinyan recognized Baku’s control over the region in 2022, under pressure from the Russian-led CSTO and the international community.

• Nagorno-Karabakh Peace: Armenian President Pashinyan expressed his desire to continue negotiations with Azerbaijani President Aliyev. Pashinyan is interested in American and EU mediation, and is “interested” in the idea of third-party management over the Zangazur Corridor, a route that transits Armenian territory and would provide Azerbaijan direct access to its exclave Nakhchivan.

  • CSTO: The Collective Security Treaty Organization is a Russian-led post-Soviet military alliance considered to be a counter to NATO. Armenia’s membership has been on hold since the second Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (2020-2023) due to Russia's failure to intervene on Armenia’s behalf.
    With the U.S. and EU showing interest in mediation and assisting Armenia, Pashinyan has stated that Yerevan may withdraw from the CSTO entirely.

• Chechnya: In early July, The New York Times reported that Chechen strongman and Putin ally Ramzan Kadyrov is likely seriously ill due to his absence from public view.
  Kadyrov was awarded rule over Chechnya by Putin due to his success in controlling Islamic movements and civil disobedience in the 1990s and 2000s. Now, with no clear successor, reporting suggests Russia may face further civil violence in the region if a power vacuum develops.

Why This Matters
These developments in the Caucasus are significant because they suggest Russia is slowly losing its historical control and influence over the region. Russia’s continued political corruption, growing economic crisis, and war in Ukraine appear to be creating opportunities for other actors to increase their own regional influence.

Armenia is, for example, likely to leave the CSTO and begin European Union accession. In Chechnya, the growing likelihood of a power vacuum due to Kadyrov’s health suggests Russia may experience violence within its own borders, much like what occurred during the First Chechen War (1994-1996) and Second Chechen War (1999-2009).

Should Russia's influence wane further, the region could become a more competitive arena for influence, potentially reshaping alliances and impacting energy transit, security, and economic development across Eurasia. Players like China and Turkey are likely to attempt to fill the influence gap.

Sources: Middle East Eye, Arka News Agency, The New York Times, PONARS Eurasia

EU Foreign Ministers Fail To Adopt 18th Russian Sanctions Package

Summary
On 15 July, EU Foreign Ministers met in Brussels, Belgium, to vote on the adoption of new Russian sanctions. Slovakia reportedly withheld its support for the sanctions package due to disagreements regarding the cessation of Russian gas imports by 2028. The package requires all 27 EU member states to support its adoption.

Findings

• 17th Sanctions Package: On 20 May, the EU adopted the 17th sanctions package on Russia, which includes sanctions against 17 individuals and 58 entities, port bans on Russian shadow fleet vessels, export restrictions for dual-use technologies and goods being used for industry.

  The proposed 18th sanctions package would build on these measures, with greater emphasis on Russia’s energy sector. The EU would be seeking to put price caps on Russia’s gas exports, and would look to ban transactions with certain exporters, most notably the Nord Stream Pipeline.

• Progress: Kaja Kallas, the EU’s VP and top foreign affairs diplomat, stated there is optimism in passing the package. The Moscow Times, citing Reuters, reports that the EU Commission notified Slovak Prime Minister Fico that his concerns are being accounted for.

  Fico has called for a postponement of the 18th sanctions package vote due to Slovakia’s vehement rejection of the REPower EU proposal and the plan to end Russian gas imports by 2028.

Why This Matters
The EU’s failure to pass the 18th sanctions package highlights European governance frustrations, by which supranationalist desires are not fully reconciled with member state interests, needs, or obligations; that is, there is no genuine consensus despite the EU Commission’s official party line.

Slovakia’s opposition is a prime example of this. Due to its reliance on Russian gas and concerns about the financial impacts of import bans by 2028, unaddressed domestic issues hold up the EU’s foreign policy. This reflects a broader tension within the EU between the strategic goal of weakening Russia's war economy and the immediate economic security needs of individual member states. While sanctions aim to limit Russia's ability to fund its military operations in Ukraine, a fragmented or delayed approach can reduce their overall effectiveness, potentially prolonging the conflict or allowing Russia to adapt to sanctions before they are imposed.

If the package is not passed late on 16 July, it is uncertain how or when a voting session will be reconvened.

Data cutoff: 16 July 2025

Sources: The Moscow Times, DW, Reuters, European Commission

End Brief

That concludes this brief. Thank you for reading!

— Nick