
Pacific Weekly #91
Good morning and happy Sunday,
This is Pacific Weekly, a premium exclusive of The Intel Brief intended to keep you updated on events across the hotly contested Indo-Pacific region.
Reporting Period: March 16-22, 2026
Bottom-Line Up Front:
1. China has suggested that the Philippines granted sovereignty of Scarborough Shoal in a 1990 letter between diplomats. The Philippines has denied the claim. Similarly, the Philippines has rejected claims that Manila and Beijing are close to establishing an agreement to coordinate joint coast guard operations.
2. US Treasury Secretary Bessent met with the Chinese Vice Premier to discuss trade. The pair met in Paris, France, and reportedly discussed preserving and enhancing the 2025 trade truce between President Trump and Xi Jinping. It is very likely that the delegates have restarted the coordination for a Trump and Xi meeting.
3. On March 15, Taiwan reported a surge in Chinese military activity around the island, citing naval and aerial incursions. At the same time, reporting claims China is refining its ability to employ and sustain naval blockades as a means of isolating Taiwan.
Philippines Denies Chinese Maritime Claims, Coast Guard Cooperation
Summary
China has suggested that the Philippines granted sovereignty of Scarborough Shoal in a 1990 letter between diplomats. The Philippines has denied the claim. Similarly, the Philippines has rejected claims that Manila and Beijing are close to establishing an agreement to coordinate joint coast guard operations.
Findings and Analysis
Chinese Claims Based on 1990 Letter: On March 14, 2026, the Chinese Embassy to the Philippines issued a statement claiming that the Scarborough Shoal (also known as Bajo de Masinloc) was ceded to China in a 1990 letter written by former Philippine Ambassador Bienvenido Tan Jr. (Daily Tribune, X). On March 16, Rear Admiral Tarriela, the Philippine Coast Guard’s spokesperson for the West Philippine Sea, characterized China’s claims as a “deliberate distortion of historical record,” and even if Ambassador Tan did cede Scarborough Shoal, ambassadorial authorities do not cover territorial claims (X).
Comment: The Scarborough Shoal, nearly 124 nautical miles off the coast of Zambales, sits well within the 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of the Philippines. In 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague ruled that China’s “9-Dash Line” claims had no legal basis under the United Nations’ maritime law (Daily Tribune).
Coast Guard Cooperation: On March 19, citing Chinese Ambassador Jing Quan, it was reported that a “draft coast guard cooperation agreement between the Philippines and China is 95 percent complete” (Business Mirror, Philstar Global). According to the alleged agreement, China and the Philippines would engage in joint patrols, environmental protection, trash collection, and maritime search and rescue (Philstar Global).
On March 20, 2026, PCG Rear Admiral Tarriela stated that the Philippines and PCG are “not involved in crafting this coast guard cooperation with China” (X).
Comment: It is uncertain if China is lying about the prospective coast guard cooperation agreement for narrative gain, or if the Philippines is backpeddling on talks it was having with China. Regardless, while cooperation with China may give insight into Beijing’s operational mindset and tempo, it would certainly give China’s maritime operations legitimacy. By sailing alongside Philippine vessels for maritime patrols, Manila would essentially be validating China’s presence through mission set; something China could reference in the future to formalize its legal basis for owning and operating contested islands. Philippine decisionmakers should be willing to hold direct and frequent dialogue with Chinese counterparts as a de-escalation device. But joint patrols would be a political and legal defeat for the Philippines.
US, China Begin Trade Talks In Paris, France
Summary
US Treasury Secretary Bessent met with the Chinese Vice Premier to discuss trade. The pair met in Paris, France, and reportedly discussed preserving and enhancing the 2025 trade truce between President Trump and Xi Jinping. It is very likely that the delegates have restarted the coordination for a Trump and Xi meeting.
Findings and Analysis
Trade Talks: On March 15, American and Chinese diplomats met in Paris to discuss mutual economic policies and trade (Reuters, Xinhua). According to Reuters, US Treasury Secretary Scorr Bessent met with Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng, and the two discussed preserving and progressing the trade truce and framework from 2025 (Reuters).
Comment: Chinese media confirms that the talks were based on progress made “during their meeting in Busan and all previous phone calls,” implying some precedence for a future meeting between President Trump and Xi Jinping, and a US-China trade agreement (Xinhua). Overall, the talks can be interpreted as a diplomatic reset or stabilization.
Details: While details are sparse, reporting suggests the delegates discussed tariffs, export controls on technologies, the purchase of agricultural goods, and trade compliance (Reuters). Additionally, the US continues to address trade as it relates to China’s grip on rare earth materials (Reuters).
Comment: There is the possibility, given the ongoing operations in the Middle East and their effect on oil, that Iran could be central to negotiations. The US is likely to attempt to convince China to halt intelligence sharing with Iran, or to assist with the escort of ships through the Strait of Hormuz.
Taiwan Reports Surge In PLA Activity Around The Island
Summary
On March 15, Taiwan reported a surge in Chinese military activity around the island, citing naval and aerial incursions. At the same time, reporting claims China is refining its ability to employ and sustain naval blockades as a means of isolating Taiwan.
Findings and Analysis
Recent PLA Activity: On March 15, Taiwan reported that it detected 26 PLA aircraft and at least 7 naval vessels operating around the island, the largest incursion since February (Reuters, Asahi). Following a “10-day hiatus,” The Wall Street Journal reports that 16 of the 24 aircraft directly breached Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) (WSJ).
Comment: China’s resumption of naval and aerial incursions suggests it is committed to its strategy of Salami Slicing, an effort to extoll Taiwanese resources, challenge readiness, and blur the lines between standard military maneuvers and a genuine invasion. The activities also give China a wealth of valuable experience, where PLA commands and theater components can rehearse and refine operational plans while tactical-level practitioners develop their skillsets.
Blockade Rehearsals: The Japan Times has reported that Chinese naval forces are expanding their ability to surround Taiwan and control it by blocking critical sea lanes (The Japan Times).
Comment: These actions are supported by previous PLA exercises, as well as observed maneuvers by the Chinese Maritime Militia (CMM). In various scenarios, PLA Navy assets encircle Taiwan to facilitate large-scale ship-to-shore and naval support operations. In other scenarios, CMM vessels have been observed forming armadas, which could be used to block adversary vessels or cause blockades at strategic waterways and ports.
Voice dictation that doesn't mangle your syntax.
Most dictation tools choke on technical language. Wispr Flow doesn't. It understands code syntax, framework names, and developer jargon - so you can dictate directly into your IDE and send without fixing.
Use it everywhere: Cursor, VS Code, Slack, Linear, Notion, your browser. Flow sits at the system level, so there's nothing to install per-app. Tap and talk.
Developers use Flow to write documentation 4x faster, give coding agents richer context, and respond to Slack without breaking focus. 89% of messages go out with zero edits.
Millions of users worldwide. Now on Mac, Windows, iPhone, and Android (free and unlimited on Android during launch).
End Brief
That concludes this edition of Pacific Weekly.
Did you enjoy this newsletter?
Thank you for reading!
— Nick
This publication is an Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) product and does not contain Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) or Classified Information.
Comments represent the analysis, opinions, and estimates of The Intel Brief writer(s).


