Pacific Weekly #79
Good morning and happy Sunday,
This is Pacific Weekly, a premium exclusive of The Intel Brief intended to keep you updated on events across the hotly contested Indo-Pacific region.
Reporting Period: December 15-21, 2025
Bottom-Line Up Front:
1. On December 17, the United States approved an $11 billion arms deal to Taiwan. The details were confirmed by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). The sale is intended to boost Taiwan’s self-defense and A2/AD capability, despite the fact that previous military sales are backlogged in Washington.
2. On December 16, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense authorized a “distributed control” concept. The command authority allows Taiwanese military commanders to defend themselves with lethal force if attacked, reducing the need to rely on approval from a central command authority.
3. On December 19, the Institute for the Study of War detailed how the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is relying on Russia for aviation and airborne operational training. China is leveraging its strategic relationship with Russia to procure Russian aircraft, equipment, and training to better conduct combined arms operations in preparation for an invasion of Taiwan.
U.S. Approves Largest Arms Deal Ever To Taiwan, Angering China
Summary
On December 17, the United States approved an $11 billion arms deal to Taiwan. The details were confirmed by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). The sale is intended to boost Taiwan’s self-defense and A2/AD capability, despite the fact that previous military sales are backlogged in Washington.
Findings
Major Arms Sale to Taiwan: On December 17, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) announced a major arms sale to Taiwan (DSCA). The arms sale is the second of President Trump’s second term, and the largest U.S. arms sale to Taiwan ever (Reuters, DW). The deal is valued at over $11 billion (AP News, Reuters).
Details: DSCA details specific deals that make up the total arms package: It includes parts, support, components, equipment, and services for FIM092 Stinger missiles, Tactical Mission Network software, AH-1W Super Cobra helicopters, M109A7 Paladin howitzers, the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS), TOW missile systems, Javelin missile systems, Harpoon missile repairs, ALTIUS-700M, and ALTIUS-600 systems (DSCA).
These capabilities drastically improve Taiwan’s organic defense capability, and the notable sale of the HIMARS rocket artillery is a massive boost to Taipei’s stand-off fires capability.
Taiwan’s Response: On December 18, Taiwan’s Presidential Office thanked President Trump and his administration for approving the arms sale (Office of the President, ROC). The office praised the sale as the U.S. demonstrating its commitment to the Taiwan Relations Act and the “Six Assurances” (Office of the President, ROC).
Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of National Defense also praised the sale (MOFA ROC, MND ROC).
China’s Response: On December 18, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement denouncing Washington’s decision to proceed with the $11 billion arms sale to Taiwan (China MFA). In particular, China characterized the move as “grossly interfering in China’s internal affairs,” which will very likely deteriorate Sino-U.S. relations, especially regarding trade and regulations (China MFA).
Why This Matters
This arms deal is a major win for Taiwan, and especially for President Lai Ching-te, who has overseen the creation of a massive annual defense budget for Taipei.
These weapons systems and the support being provided in the deal are a major leap in Taiwan’s efforts to build a modern, capable, and complete Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) capability.
That being said, there should be some hesitancy. The U.S. already has a backlog of weapons deliveries and military sales deliveries to Taiwan (upwards of $20 billion), which means Washington needs to rapidly accelerate its deliveries and, if necessary, production of some of these systems.
On December 11, likely in preparation for this arms sale, the Senate passed a bill to accelerate military equipment transfers to Taiwan (Focus Taiwan).
Taiwan Approves Decentralized Command Authority To Facilitate Rapid Response To Chinese Attack
Summary
On December 16, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense authorized a “distributed control” concept. The command authority allows Taiwanese military commanders to defend themselves with lethal force if attacked, reducing the need to rely on approval from a central command authority.
Findings
Report to Government: On December 16, it was reported that the Taiwanese military notified the Legislative Yuan that all units will “operate under a decentralized mode of command without awaiting orders from above” to facilitate a rapid response to a “sudden Chinese attack” (The Asahi Shimbun, Reuters).
Centralized Command, Decentralized Control: A common operational philosophy in the United States Marine Corps, Taiwan appears to be adopting a similar “Centralized Command, Decentralized Control” command hierarchy (MCDP 6 Command and Control). In this concept, senior leaders clarify their intent, mission parameters, and vision of success while providing subordinate commanders the authority to act based on time, information, environment, support, etc. (MCDP 6 Command and Control).
“If the enemy suddenly launches an attack, all units are to implement “distributed control” without waiting for orders.”
Operating Environment: Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense publishes data on China’s daily incursions and operations around the island (MOD ROC). Those daily incursions and exercises are what Taiwan calls a “grey zone harassment and pressure campaign” designed to strain Taiwanese civil and military assets (The Asahi Shimbun). As China continues to expand the PLA, its capabilities, and invasion rehearsals, there is a persistent risk that those coercive operations (which have gone on for decades) will one day be real, turning a Taiwan Strait flashpoint into a kinetic conflict without proper preparation.
Why This Matters
Take the considerations for the operating environment into account. Taiwan’s decentralized control concept will require the military to operate a large, constant force of sensors for intelligence, early warning, and control of assets, to support a rapid response (anywhere on the island) by coastal defense units and aircraft.
It is a massive and expensive undertaking, especially as 2027 draws near. The other risk, which is not as critical as being prepared for a sudden invasion, is that individual units will have to generate response SOPs as to avoid a kinetic response to scenarios that remain uncertain. That is, it is extremely difficult for personnel to know when “the real thing” is happening when you have operated in the “grey zone” your entire career. It is even more difficult to fire the first shot in that uncertain moment.
Russia Is Helping China Develop Its Airborne Capability, Selling Beijing Weapons Systems
Summary
On December 19, the Institute for the Study of War detailed how the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is relying on Russia for aviation and airborne operational training. China is leveraging its strategic relationship with Russia to procure Russian aircraft, equipment, and training to better conduct combined arms operations in preparation for an invasion of Taiwan.
Findings
Clandestine Meetings: ISW reported, citing the Kyiv Independent, that more than 40 PLA officers, defense industry personnel, and CCP officials secretly visited Russia from 2023 to 2024 to procure Russian airborne equipment and conduct training (ISW, The Kyiv Independent).
Transport Aircraft: The reports detail China’s intent to purchase 10 Ilyushin-78M-90A tanker aircraft (ISW, The Kyiv Independent). Additionally, the reports state China intends to procure “a battalion’s worth” of equipment capable of being paradropped from transport aircraft, including 37 BMD-4m IFVs, 11 BTR-MDM APCs, and 11 Sprut-SDM1 AT guns (ISW, The Kyiv Independent).
Training: PLA officers reportedly requested Russian counterparts to provide in-country training for PLAAF and PLAN pilots, as well as training for engineers and airborne C2 operators (ISW, The Kyiv Independent).
Why This Matters
PLA procurement of Russian aircraft, armor, and training signals Beijing’s vigorous efforts to close gaps in strategic capabilities and to expand the Sino-Russian partnership. The procurement and cooperation also shed light on a potential key component of an invasion of Taiwan: the rapid seizure of key terrain by deploying airborne-capable assets.
While these procurements marginally improve PLA airborne lethality and survivability, they do not eliminate the extreme risk of contested airborne insertions against a prepared defender with integrated air defenses and armored forces. For U.S. and Taiwanese planners, this cooperation reinforces the importance of denying airfield seizure, hardening counter-airborne defenses, and targeting PLA transport and sustainment assets early in a conflict, as airborne operations remain a vulnerable but strategically consequential capability for China.
End Brief
That concludes this edition of Pacific Weekly.
Did you enjoy this newsletter?
Thank you for reading!
— Nick
This publication is an Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) product and does not contain Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) or Classified Information.