Good morning and happy Sunday,

This is Pacific Weekly, a premium exclusive of The Intel Brief intended to keep you updated on events across the hotly contested Indo-Pacific region.

Reporting Period: October 13-19, 2025

Bottom-Line Up Front:

China Purges Senior PLA Officials Following Corruption Investigations

Summary
On October 17, 2025, China’s Defense Ministry confirmed that nine senior officials were purged from their positions in the Communist Party. One of the officials was China’s most senior general, while the eight others were members of the Central Committee, China’s highest political body aside from a convened National Congress. The Central Committee is meeting for a plenary session next week.

Findings

• Fresh Purges: On Friday, China’s Defense Ministry announced that nine senior military officials were removed from their positions and expelled from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) (BBC). Those nine officials are:

  • He Wedong: Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) and CCP Politburo member—Xi’s senior military official and advisor.

  • Miao Hua: Political Work Director of the CMC—chief ideologue and military propagandist.

  • He Hongjun: Executive Deputy Director of the CMC’s Political Work Department.

  • Wang Xiubin: Executive Deputy Director of the CMC’s Joint Operations Command Center—a leading strategic and operational planner.

  • Lin Xiangyang: Commander of the Eastern Theater Command—the theater units responsible for an rehearsing and executing an invasion of Taiwan, as well as ongoing First Island Chain incursions.

  • Qin Shutong: Political Commissar of the PLA Army.

  • Yuan Huazhi: Political Commissar of the PLA Navy.

  • Wang Houbin: Commander of the PLA Rocket Force’s missile and nuclear division.

  • Wang Channing: Commander of the People’s Armed Police Force.

  He Weidong is the most senior military official to be purged under Xi Jinping’s tenure as paramount leader (NHK). The officials were purged due to “duty-related” crimes involving money, and that their removal was a part of an ongoing anti-corruption campaign (NHK, BBC).

• Upcoming Plenary Session: On October 20, the Fourth Plenum will convene (BBC, Stratfor). During the plenary session, Chinese officials will discuss the details of what should being Beijing’s next five-year plan; an chiefly economic plan that also includes sets goals regarding political, social, and security domains. Monitoring the attendance of the plenary session may provide greater insights into how extensive the recent anti-corruption purges were (BBC).

Why This Matters
BBC’s commentary on the purges is interesting, as it highlights how Xi’s continued purges—which are very likely to continue—are a power move intended to improve discipline, party image and standards, and efficiency.

One thing this kind of reporting leaves out, however, is the direct considerations to China’s military ambitions and domestic security environment. Perhaps some of these officials were removed for cooperating with a foreign adversary, perhaps they were overly cautious, or interfered with the PLA’s modernization and capability expansion efforts. We may never know those details, but by removing officials of questionable loyalty and capability, Xi can better assure himself that he retains a true top-down decision-making party and military, and that orders in a crisis or conflict will be followed and carried out.

Domestically, which is more pertinent to the removal of political commissars and police officials, Xi is also trying to retain control over the leaders (and their personnel) that he may need to mobilize against civil protests, opposition, or coups.

Multinational Naval Drills Conducted In South China Sea

Summary
This week, the Philippines, U.S., Japan, Canada, and France conducted a surface warfare exercise in the South China Sea. The multilateral drill tested joint ship maneuvers, coordinated maritime strike planning, and shared command and control protocols, displaying increased interoperability and a growing forward presence in contested waters.

Findings

• Scale and Scope: The exercise brought together naval units from the Philippines, United States, Japan, Canada, and France. It focused on surface warfare tactics under a coordinated naval command (USNI News). The drills took place in areas of the South China Sea where sovereignty and maritime claims are disputed, including zones around the Philippines’ claimed territories (USNI News).

• Drills: Participating forces tested ship-to-ship coordination, targeting integration, defensive maneuvers, and command interoperability. The emphasis was on combining capabilities under multinational command rather than individual national tactics (USNI News).

Why This Matters
This exercise marks a tactical and symbolic escalation in regional maritime deterrence against Chinese coercion. By integrating Philippine ships with U.S., Japanese, Canadian, and French naval assets in contested sea zones, the alliance demonstrates that freedom of navigation and maritime order are not bilateral issues between the Philippines and China — they are collective commitments backed by powerful partners.

For Beijing, such drills raise the cost of brinkmanship: any aggressive maneuver risks confronting a multilateral force. For the U.S. and its allies, these operations contribute to a forward naval posture, complicate China’s ability to block sea lanes, and reinforce deterrence across the first island chain. The real test will be whether these coalitions can sustain presence, deterrent posture, and logistical support in the long term—and whether China accepts these drills as legitimate or responds with its own countermeasures.

U.S. Continues Guam Investments To Counter China

Summary
In mid-October 2025, reporting confirmed the U.S. is dramatically accelerating military investment in Guam to counter PLA missile, air, and naval threats. New infrastructure projects include expanded radar, enhanced missile defenses, a submarine maintenance hub, and increased troop basing. The moves reflect Washington’s increasing reliance on Guam as a forward base in the event of a First Island Chain conflict.

Findings

• Investment: The U.S. plans to spend billions on Guam’s defense infrastructure through 2028, projects which will total more than $6 billion (Taipei Times). Upgrades include expansion of Camp Blaz, new submarine maintenance facilities, and enhancements to Andersen Air Force Base to better support long-range air operations (Taipei Times). This is also alongside airfield modernization efforts on Tinian, a smaller island in the Marianas island chain. Deployment projections aim to increase troop numbers by 10,000 by 2037, pushing total U.S. personnel on the island to ~34,000 (Taipei Times).

• Upgraded Defenses: To defend the new facilities and personnel on Guam, a contract of $181.8 million was awarded to support the development of the Guam Defense System (Yahoo). Concurrently, reports describe the planned deployment of an Enhanced Integrated Air and Missile Defense (EIAMD) architecture around Guam, combining SM-3 Block IIA, SM-6, Patriot PAC-3 MSE, THAAD, and other interceptors across multiple sites (Army Recognition).

Why This Matters
The continued investments into Guam only confirm the United States’ need for developing a force posture beyond the second island chain. This is not only to help contest Chinese efforts in the open sea, but it will allow the U.S. Air Force and Navy to support future operations into the First Island China in the event of conflict with China—especially a scenario in which the U.S. initially loses or withdraws from its bases in Japan, the Philippines, or South Korea.

End Brief

That concludes this edition of Pacific Weekly.

Thank you for reading!
— Nick