Good morning and happy Sunday,

This is Pacific Weekly, a premium exclusive of The Intel Brief intended to keep you updated on events across the hotly contested Indo-Pacific region.

Reporting Period: 25-31 August 2025

Bottom-Line Up Front:

Putin Visits China Ahead Of WWII Ceremony; Deepening Strategic Ties With China

Summary
On 30 August, Russian President Putin arrived in China to visit with Chinese paramount Leader Xi Jinping. Putin’s visit will include participation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit and a parade for victory during World War II. Putin’s visit was preceded by joint Russian-Chinese military patrols, and a visit to China from Russia’s chairman of the state Duma.

Findings

• Background: Before Putin’s visit to China, various military and diplomatic engagements were planned to reinforce the growing strategic relationship between Russia and China:

  • Greater Security Cooperation: On 25 August, the chairman of Russia’s State Duma (like a European Parliament or the House of Representatives) traveled to Beijing. On 26 August, Chairman Volodin met with Xi Jinping. According to Reuters, the Chinese leader stated that Russia and China “should jointly safeguard their security and development interests.”

  • Annual Patrols: On 20 August, the Russian Navy and People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) concluded their fifth joint naval patrol in the Sea of Japan. USNI News reports that the patrols were a 2025 iteration of annual patrols between Moscow and Beijing.

• Putin’s Visit to China: On 30 August, Putin traveled to China for a diplomatic visit, which is expected to last nearly a week. Putin will attend the SCO Summit in Tianjin, China, as well as the Victory Day parade in Beijing on 3 September. Putin is expected to be Xi’s guest of honor at the parade.
  Core to Xi’s and Putin’s relationship is the “no limits” interpretation of strategic cooperation between Beijing and Moscow, which includes deeper integration on security, international diplomacy, and energy, for example.

  • Previous Visit: Xi Jinping visited Moscow from 7 to 10 May for Russia’s Victory Day parade.

Why This Matters
Putin’s visit to China, timed alongside the SCO Summit and Beijing’s Victory Day parade, is as much about symbolism as it is about strategy. It suggests that Russia and China are investing in the expansion of their partnership, presenting themselves as the leaders of a new, multipolar world that pushes back against U.S. dominance. For Russia, China remains a critical lifeline while sanctions cut off Western ties. For China, Russia adds an extra layer of backing as it pushes its agenda in the South China Sea and broader Indo-Pacific, making it more difficult for the U.S. and its allies to respond with a clear, unified strategy.

The parade and speeches hammer home a narrative of resisting Western financial and political influence, while the SCO summit gives Putin room to widen Russia’s circle—especially with India, which is trying to balance U.S. trade ties along with its tense relationship with Beijing.

In the bigger picture, closer ties between Moscow and Beijing make it harder for the West to isolate Russia and give China more room to assert itself regionally. Together, they’re shaping global forums, building alternative institutions, and shifting power dynamics across Eurasia in ways that directly challenge U.S. influence.

Sources: The Guardian, USNI News, Reuters

Trump Hosts South Korean President At White House

Summary
On 25 August, President Trump hosted South Korean President Lee at the White House. The meeting was mostly received in a positive light, and highlights include renewed efforts to engage in diplomacy with North Korea, trade between the U.S. and South Korea, and the American-South Korean military partnership.

Findings

• Pre-Meeting Statements: President Trump stirred some early media attention with a social media post about a “purge or revolution” in South Korea. But once they met in person, the atmosphere flipped when President Lee praised Trump’s leadership, and even joked about building a “Trump Tower” in North Korea and playing golf with Kim Jong-un. Critics of Trump’s suggested Lee was making fun of Trump and undercutting his demeanor and foreign policy platform.

• North Korean Nuclearization: Lee warned that North Korea’s nuclear arsenal had expanded significantly—he estimated 2.5 times more weapons in just a few years—and said they might soon be capable of striking the U.S. mainland. Both leaders expressed interest in reigniting diplomacy, with Trump saying he’d like to meet Kim Jong-un again “this year.”

• Economic Partnership: South Korean companies pledged $150 billion in U.S. investments across shipbuilding, semiconductors, and aerospace. Notable deals include 103 Boeing jets from Korean Air and $26 billion from Hyundai for U.S. manufacturing and robotics. These are part of a broader $350 billion investment package tied to a new trade understanding that reduces U.S. tariffs on Korean goods.

• Security Cooperation: Lee also announced plans to upgrade the U.S.–South Korea military partnership, despite efforts by South Korea to reclaim total operational control over its armed forces. He talked about boosting South Korea’s defense spending and transforming its military into a “smart force” ready for future threats.
  Trump called for South Korea to not only spend more on defense, but to share the burden of costs related to the 28,000+ U.S. personnel deployed to the country.

Why This Matters
The White House visit showcased Lee’s diplomatic skill and set up a favorable relationship between Trump and Lee. Lee not only skirted a potential confrontation but also delivered on economic and security fronts that matter to Trump. With major investment commitments on the table and a willingness to engage again with North Korea, the meeting positioned both leaders to capitalize on some new diplomatic momentum.

For the U.S., this deepens economic ties and shuffles the strategic deck in East Asia—offering renewed leverage for regional stability. The new investment on semiconductors and shipbuilding is critical for long-term U.S. strategy, and is likely to be the cornerstone of U.S.-South Korean relations.

Sources: CNN, BBC, AP News, Reuters

Second Recall Vote In Taiwan Fails

Summary
On 23 August, Taiwan held its second round of recall elections against opposition Kuomintang (KMT) lawmakers, but voters once again rejected the efforts. All seven KMT legislators retained their seats, echoing the results of July’s failed attempt to unseat 24 KMT legislators, marking a significant setback for the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and its allies.

Findings

• Background: In July, Taiwanese voters went to the polls to decide whether to retain 24 KMT legislators, or remove them from office. The recall vote was organized by the ruling DPP due to allegations that KMT legislators were pursuing pro-China policies, or had relationships with CCP contacts.

• Second Recall Vote: On 23 August, the second round of recall voting was held against 7 KMT legislators, all of which retained their seat in the Legislative Yuan. The second recall round saw lower voter turnout and support compared to July, with turnout dropping from 56.1% to 49.2%, and support dropping from 42.2% to 33.8%.

• DPP’s Declining Influence: The recall vote’s failure reflects the DPP’s struggle to mobilize public support and advance ambitious policies, further entrenching the “minority-government, majority-opposition” stalemate under President Lai. In response, the DPP has signaled an internal recalibration with personnel reshuffles planned and shifts in policy priorities toward economic stability, livelihoods, youth engagement, and fiscal resilience to regain political footing.

Why This Matters
The failure of Taiwan’s recall votes highlights both the resilience of the island’s democratic institutions and the intensity of its partisan polarization. Voters appear increasingly unwilling to support recalls as a tool of political warfare, which in turn strengthens the KMT–Taiwan People’s Party coalition and leaves President Lai Ching-te’s DPP facing continued legislative obstruction. The outcome signals that the DPP must pivot away from confrontation and focus instead on governance, economic stability, and public trust if it hopes to regain momentum—all while trying to manage a deteriorating security environment and China’s efforts to reintegrate Taiwan by force or diplomatic means.

Sources: AP News, Institute for the Study of War, AP News, South China Morning Post

End Brief

That concludes this edition of Pacific Weekly. Thank you for reading!

Enjoy your Sunday.
— Nick