Pacific Weekly #64

North Korea is accelerating its nuclear program, Taiwan conducts anti-ship and anti-air exercises, and America's reputation continues to diminish in Taipei.

Author

Nick W
August 24, 2025

Pacific Weekly #64

Good morning and happy Sunday,

This is Pacific Weekly, a premium exclusive of The Intel Brief intended to keep you updated on events across the hotly contested Indo-Pacific region.

Reporting Period: 18-24 August 2025

Bottom-Line Up Front:

1. Kim Jong Un ordered the acceleration of North Korea’s nuclear program. The demand was made following the commencement of exercise Ulchi Freedom Shield 25, and annual U.S.-South Korean exercise that Pyongyang frames as an American invasion rehearsal.

2. Taiwan conducted its annual “Sea and Air Precision Ammunition Firing Exercise.” The focus is on anti-ship and anti-air operations, and included drills with innovative drone technology.

3. After Trump stated Xi Jinping provided assurances to not invade Taiwan during his tenure, reporting suggests Taiwan’s trust in the United States is waning.

North Korea To Accelerate Nuclear Program Following Start Of U.S.-South Korean Exercise

Summary
On 18 August, the United States and South Korea launched exercise Ulchi Freedom Shield 25. The drills, focused on countering North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats, triggered a sharp response from Pyongyang. On 19 August, Kim Jong Un ordered the accelerated development of the DPRK’s nuclear program, framing the exercise as a prelude to invasion. While Seoul postponed over half the planned drills, citing weather and readiness, North Korea rejected any diplomatic overtures.

Findings

  • Background: On 18 August, exercise Ulchi Freedom Shield 25 commenced in South Korea. It is one of the largest annual exercises between the United States and South Korea. This year, nearly 18,000 South Korean and American personnel are participating in the exercise. The exercise will continue through 28 August.

    • Training: The exercise reportedly includes various command and control exercises, as well as various field maneuvers and live fire exercises (LFEs). Much of the exercise will focus on preparedness against North Korea’s nuclear, missile, and air forces.

    • North Korean Response: Historically, Ulchi Freedom Shield is denounced by the regime in Pyongyang, and despite the defensive flavor of the drills, is framed as an American-led invasion rehearsal. Pyongyang typically uses the exercise to justify ballistic missile tests over South Korea or the advancement of its weapons programs.

  • Postponed Drills: More than half of the 40 drills planned during Ulchi Freedom Shield have been postponed until September. South Korean officials reportedly cited weather and readiness for the decision, but NHK World Japan states that President Lee—who took office in June—is trying to persuade North Korea to engage in diplomacy.

    Kim Jong Un’s sister, Kim Yo Jong, stated Pyongyang would not engage in diplomacy with Seoul, and that the DPRK would not hesitate to retaliate in response to the exercise taking place.

  • North Korean Nuclear Development: On 19 August, North Korean state media KCNA reported that Kim Jong Un declared the rapid advancement of the DPRK’s nuclear program in response to Ulchi Freedom Shield beginning in the south. Pyongyang maintains that the U.S.-South Korean exercise is an invasion rehearsal.
    NBC News recently reported that a secret base near China puts North Korean intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in striking range of the United States.

Why This Matters
North Korea’s declaration to hasten its nuclear program in direct response to Ulchi Freedom Shield signals a continued escalation cycle that undermines regional stability and nuclear nonproliferation efforts.

This is a significant complication for President Lee, especially since South Korea is considering reclaiming full operational autonomy over its military from the United States. S,o as Lee contends with the domestic political turmoil, a troubled economy, and security reform, it only makes sense that pressure from North Korea will mount.

Taiwan Conducts Annual Precision Fires Exercise

Summary
On 19 August, Taiwan commenced its annual “Sea and Air Precision Ammunition Firing Exercise.” The drills included various live fire exercises (LEFs) and innovative drone tactics. The exercise concluded on 20 August.

Findings

  • Missile Launches: On 19 August, Taiwanese naval vessels and units with the Hai Feng Shore-Based Anti-Ship Missile Group conducted various LFEs. Taipei Times stated the drills included tests of the Hsiung Feng anti-ship missiles, Standard Missile-1s, as well as tests of U.S. Patriot systems, the Sky Bow, and the Sky Sword I system.

  • Defensive Counter Air (DCA): On 19 August, the Republic of China Air Force (ROCAF) conducted defensive counter air (DCA) operations with F-CK-1 Ching-Kuo and F-16V fighters. The aircraft engaged targets with Sky Sword II missiles, AIM-120 AMRAAMs, and AGM-65s.

  • Attack Drone Strikes: One of the major highlights of the exercise was when a “Ching Feng” drone swarm, launched from a naval vessel, struck a target at sea. The drone type and munition were undisclosed.

Why This Matters
The Sea and Air Precision Ammunition Firing Exercise is a small event, but it does a lot of good for Taiwan. It helps Taiwan’s warfighters develop tactical proficiency, while at the strategic level showcasing Taipei’s growing stand-off capabilities, a boost to any deterrence factor it still maintains.

This is especially true when we consider Taiwan’s growing competency in anti-ship and anti-air operations, and its innovation regarding UAS platforms and swarm technology. Theoretically, if Taiwan can develop, manufacture, and procure these systems quickly enough, it could continue to minimize any first-strike advantage China may be building (so long as Taiwan can count on its regional allies at the conflict’s flashpoint).

Taiwan Embraces Security Independence Following Trump Remarks, Trade Issues

Summary
On 16 August, President Trump stated that Chinese leader Xi Jinping told him he would not invade Taiwan while Trump is in office. On 19 August, Taiwan’s Foreign Ministry responded by stating Taipei must continue to rely on its own defense capabilities, and not external partners. Recently, a report by the German Marshall Fund claimed that there is growing distrust in the U.S. by Taiwanese citizens, due to security and economic uncertainties.

Findings

  • Likelihood of Invasion: In an interview with Fox News Special Report, President Trump claimed that Xi Jinping gave him a personal assurance that China would not invade Taiwan during Trump’s presidency. Xi Jinping has vowed to “reunify” China and Taiwan during his rule, with most opinions, assessments, and reporting suggesting an invasion timeline of 2027.

  • Taiwan’s Response: When asked about Trump’s remarks, Taiwan Foreign Ministry spokesperson Kuang-wei stated the following:

“Taiwan's security must be achieved through its own efforts, so our country has been dedicating itself to raising its self defence capabilities and resilience. Our country will keep working hard to do this.”

Hsiao Kuang-wei, Spokesperson, Taiwan Foreign Ministry

  • GMF Report: The German Marshall Fund (GMF), citing various sources, claims there is growing distrust of the United States in Taiwan. For example, 40.5% of respondents—up 24.2%— have a negative view of the U.S., while another survey claims that 59.6% of respondents believe the U.S. is untrustworthy.
    Nearly 40% of Taiwanese citizens do not believe the U.S. would intervene on Taiwan’s behalf in the event of a conflict with China.

Why This Matters
Trump’s remarks are interesting because there isn’t really a way to validate them, as China has not—and will not—respond to such allegations. Additionally, the U.S. has long continued a policy of strategic ambiguity with Taiwan ever since the breaking of the Mutual Defense Treaty in 1980 and the establishment of the “San Francisco System.”

Public polling in Taiwan also cites the economic relationship, and tariffs and trade negotiations, as souring the relationship and tarnishing opinions of Washington’s reliability. While a trade deal may help warm relations, Taipei is still likely to maintain its position that it is isolated and must depend on itself against Beijing.

Only a formalization of U.S.-Taiwanese relations could bring clarity to the relationship, and either deter or accelerate China’s ambitions there.

End Brief

That concludes this edition of Pacific Weekly. Thank you for reading!

Enjoy your Sunday.
— Nick

This publication is an Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) product and does not contain Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) or Classified Information.