Good morning and happy Sunday,

This is Pacific Weekly, a premium exclusive of The Intel Brief intended to keep you updated on events across the hotly contested Indo-Pacific region.

Reporting Period: 4-10 August 2025

Bottom-Line Up Front:

Russia, China Conduct Joint Patrols Following Naval Drills

Summary
On 6 August, Russia and China conducted joint naval patrols in the Sea of Japan. The patrols follow the conclusion of “Maritime Interaction 2025,” a joint naval exercise between the Russian Navy and PLAN. They demonstrate the growing scale and frequency of Russian and Chinese security cooperation.

Findings

• Background: From 1 to 5 August, the Russian Navy and People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) conducted “Maritime Interaction 2025,” a joint exercise designed to foster deeper security integration between Moscow and Beijing. The activities included anti-submarine warfare, air defense, search and rescue, and live fire exercises (LFEs).
  Reporting also designates the exercise as “Joint Sea 2025.”

• Continued Patrols: On 6 August, TASS reported that new joint patrols were being conducted in the Sea of Japan. TASS claims the patrols are to “maintain peace and stability” in the Asia-Pacific region, and are a continuation of annual Russian-Chinese patrols, the first of which was in 2021.

Why This Matters
While the exercises and concurrent patrols are not out of the ordinary, they do offer Russia and China the opportunity to share tactical knowledge and improve operational integration.

Additionally, it builds on the credit and reputation of their growing multipolar alliance. For Moscow, the Russian Navy is really the only entity that can project Russia’s strength (or appearance of strength) abroad, so it is a symbolic tool we are likely to see more of as Putin looks to gain diplomatic favor, and as China looks to legitimize its activities in the region.

Sources: TASS, South China Morning Post, Al Jazeera, The Intel Brief

CCP Officials Convene For Political Retreat Ahead Of October’s Fourth Plenum

Summary
Chinese Communist Party officials and Xi Jinping’s senior staff met in Beidaihe, China, for an informal political retreat. Historically, the retreat is for officials to discuss Chinese foreign and domestic policy agendas ahead of plenary sessions. The next session is in October, and will establish the details of Beijing’s next Five-Year Plan.

Findings

• “Beidaihe Time”: On 4 August, South China Morning Post reported that Xi Jinping’s Chief of Staff, along with “dozens” of academics and scientists, convened for informal meetings in Beidaihe, China.
  The meetings are expected to plan and coordinate details for the upcoming 15th Five-Year Plan, which will be revealed at the CCP’s Fourth Plenary Session in October 2025.
  Key agenda items are likely U.S.-Chinese trade and Taiwan.

  • Background: Beidaihe is a summer resort town in northern China. In 1953, CCP leadership would travel there in the summers, creating an informal “summer office system.”
    The practice was suspended during the Cultural Revolution, but was resumed in 1984. In 2003, Hu Jintao formally abolished the Beidaihe meetings, but senior CCP leaders continued to meet there.
    Despite Xi Jinping ruling as China’s paramount leader, the Beidaihe meetings are recurring and play a key role in strategic planning and coordination.

• 15th Five-Year Plan: 2025 is a critical year for China’s ruling CCP, as it marks the end of the 14th Five-Year Plan. In October 2025, the CCP will convene to pu tforward proposals for the 15th Five-Year plan, which will prescribe the strategic goals from 2026 through 2030.

  • Background: China’s Five-Year Plans—inspired by the same concept from the Soviet Union—began during the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949. They are considered the most “authoritative policy blueprints” and outline the strategic goals for China’s economic, social, political, and military development for a five-year period.
    While they display great political unity and a marathon-like sense of civilizational development, they also reflect the CCP’s desperate grip on top-down, centralized authority.

• Fourth Plenum: At a CPC Central Committee meeting on 30 July, Xi Jinping decided that the Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th CPC Central Committee will be held in October. At the plenum, CCP participants will “Study proposals for the 15th Five-Year Plan, among other key agenda items.”

Why This Matters
The Beidaihe sessions are usually very tightly controlled, and Chinese media does not report on them in detail. Very few leaks occur as well. However, what is certain is that the CCP uses the sessions (framed as informal vacations) to coordinate the policy agenda for future formal session.

In this case, analysts and reporters suggest this Beidaihe session was pre-coordinating the agenda for the Fourth Plenum in October. That is where China will decide the policies for its next Five-Year Plan which could undoubtedly define the criteria for an invasion of Taiwan, trade with the U.S., and major technological and economic advancements.

Given China’s growing role in the international community, and strong economic position, the plenary sessions and Five-Year Plans are increasingly important events that the West remain relatively uninterested in.

Sources: South China Morning Post, Think China, Organisation for Research on China and Asia, China Briefing, China Global Television Network

U.S., South Korea Prepare For Exercise Ulchi Freedom Shield 25

Summary
On 7 August, AP News confirmed that the annual exercise Ulchi Freedom Shield between the United States and South Korea will begin on 18 August. The exercise is one of the annual large-scale exercises held in South Korea, and will include command and control exercises and various field exercises. The drills are typically used by North Korea to justify non-violent retaliation, such as ballistic missile tests.

Findings

• Ulchi Freedom Shield 25: This exercise is one of the two largest annual exercises hosted by South Korea, and one the largest bilateral ones with the United States. This year it will run from 18 to 28 August.

  This year, nearly 18,000 South Korean and American personnel will participate in the exercise.

  • Training: Reporting states that the exercise will include various live and simulated command and control exercises, as well as various field maneuvers. Typically, these drills are designed to prepare for hostilities with North Korea.

• North Korean Response: Each year, North Korea denounces the exercise and depicts them as invasion preparations. Last year, North Korea responded by conducting ICBM launched which traveled over civilian centers and landed in the Pacific Ocean.

Why This Matters
Ulchi Freedom Shield is foundational to the U.S.-South Korean security relationship which, due to previous trade tensions and South Korea’s domestic political turmoil, is under some scrutiny.

UFS also draws a lot of attention because it typically prompts a North Korean response, something that is likely to happen this year following the exercise’s conclusion.

Sources: AP News, PACOM

End Brief

That concludes this edition of Pacific Weekly.

Thank you for reading!
— Nick