Good morning and happy Sunday,

This is Pacific Weekly, a premium exclusive of The Intel Brief intended to keep you updated on events across the hotly contested Indo-Pacific region.

I am sharing this edition with you because it has important (and extensive) updates. Enjoy.

Reporting Period: 21-27 July 2025

Bottom-Line Up Front:

U.S. Pushes For Ceasefire As Violent Clashes Continue Between Thailand, Cambodia

Summary
On 24 July, clashes between Thai and Cambodian forces erupted along the shared border. As military actions escalate, civilian and military casualties continue to be reported, with more than 130,000 civilians having already been displaced. President Trump stated he organized ceasefire negotiations, but fighting has continued into 26 July, with Thai forces displaying superiority.

Findings
Due to this conflict stemming from previous colonial administration and international decision-making, The Intel Brief is providing a timeline analysis regarding the recent cross-border skirmishes:

• Background: This conflict is primarily fueled by growing nationalism in Thailand and Cambodia, 20th-century nation-building, and previous skirmishes.

  • 1907 Border Rulings: In 1907, a French-led border commission established an official border between Siam (Thailand) and Cambodia. The ruling placed the Preah Vihear temple ruins within Cambodia’s borders.

    

    Description: The location of Preah Vihear Temple, the primary cultural and territorial dispute behind previous Thai and Cambodian clashes. Google Earth Pro

  • 1959 ICJ Petition: In 1959, Cambodia filed a case with the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which requested a review and declaration of whether Thailand should withdraw forces stationed at Preah Vihear and recognize Cambodia’s sovereignty over the territory.

  • 1962 ICJ Ruling: In June 1962, the ICJ ruling awarded the temple to Cambodia, but did not specify whether Thailand or Cambodia owned the surrounding territory along the Dângrêk Mountain’s watershed.
    Thailand withdrew its forces from the temple in 1963, in part due to the Cambodian Civil War.

  • 2008 UNESCO Application: During the 32nd World Heritage Committee session, Cambodia applied for Preah Vihear’s designation as a UNESCO World Heritage site.
    Thailand objected due continued disputes over ownership of the surrounding territory.
    From 2008 to 2011, various cross-border clashes occurred.

  

  Preah Vihear is an ancient Khmer temple situated at the summit of the Dângrêk Mountains. The temple’s construction dates to the 9th century during the first flourishing of the Khmer Empire. Cambodia Lifestyle

  • 2013 ICJ Petition: In 2013, Cambodia sought ICJ clarification on ownership of Preah Vihear and the surrounding disputed territories. The ICJ ruled “unanimously, that the Judgement of 15 June 1962 decided that Cambodia had sovereignty over the whole territory of the promontory of Preah Vihear… Thailand was under obligation to withdraw from that territory.”

• Prelude: On 28 May, a skirmish broke out between Thai and Cambodian forces in the “Emerald Triangle” along the Preah Vihear province border. Both sides agreed to bilateral talks, but on 7 June, the Royal Tahi Army declared it would reinforce its positions on the border. The tensions led to Cambodian border closures and trade restrictions. On 20 June, Thailand announced it had downgraded diplomatic relations with Cambodia in response.

  On 1 July, Prime Minister Paetongtarn was suspended from office by Thailand’s Constitutional Court after a phone call between her and former Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen leaked to the public. Despite claiming the talks were de-escalatory, they drew public criticism due to Paetongtarn reportedly calling Hun Sen “uncle” and criticizing a Thai military commander.

• 2025 Cambodia-Thailand Clashes: On 24 July, both Cambodia and Thailand reported that border clashes were initiated by the other. A timeline of escalatory military actions suggests these border clashes will develop into a conventional conflict:

• 23 July: On Wednesday, Thai media outlet The Nation stated that the strategic-level “Chakrabongse Bhuvanath” plan was in effect. The plan coordinates joint Thai operations and was created after the 2011 Preah Vihear conflict.

• 24 July: In the morning, Thai soldiers reported drones flying around the Ta Muen Thom temple as well as armed Cambodian soldiers along barbed wire fencing.
  Thailand reported that Cambodian forces fired BM-21 rockets into Prasat Don Tuan. At approximately 11:00 AM, the Royal Thai Air Force responded to reports of hostilities by bombing Cambodian positions in Ching An Ma, Ubon Ratchathani, with six F-16s.
  Shortly after airstrikes were conducted, the Thai embassy in Thailand requested all citizens in Cambodia to depart the country.
  Thailand also announced the closure of the border with Cambodia.
  At 11:54 AM, Thai PBS News reported that Cambodian soldiers attacked Phnom Dângrêk Hospital.

  At 3:00 PM, the Royal Thai Army announced it had launched “Operation Yutta Bodin” under the command of General Khlaeoplotthuk, the Royal Thai Army’s incumbent commander-in-chief.

• 25 July: Clashes continued into 25 July, especially in border regions. This includes the area around Preah Vihear Temple.

  Thailand’s acting Prime Minister Wechayachai stated that the conflict could escalate. Thailand had rejected offers of third-party mediation from the United States, China, and Malaysia (current ASEAN Chair).
  The Royal Thai Air Force conducted airstrikes on seven locations inside Cambodia.
  At 5:32 EST, Reuters reported that Cambodia called for an unconditional ceasefire with Thailand.

• 26 July: Saturday marks the third consecutive day of fighting. Apart from their use of BM-21 MLRS rockets and dated T-55 MBTs, the Cambodian force appears significantly inferior to Thailand. The Royal Thai Army and Air Force are supplied with American and European weapons and platforms. Thai forces have demonstrated the capability to conduct complex, relevant, and effective joint operations, including combined arms operations (i.e. ground maneuver, artillery and armor, and air support).
  On 26 July, The Phnom Penh Post reported the Royal Thai Navy has launched Operation “Trat Pikhart Pairee 1,” a naval barrage and assault into Pursat and Koh Kong provinces (Cambodia).
  On Saturday, President Trump stated he spoke to the Prime Ministers of Thailand and Cambodia, where he relayed mutual desires for peace. Ceasefire negotiations are being coordinated.

Why This Matters
The renewed fighting between Cambodia and Thailand over Preah Vihear appears to have already expanded into a broader conflict, with the Preah Vihear dispute looking more like a casus belli.

Thailand’s military dominance, in part due to outright air superiority, superior weapons, and superior training, has manifested into Thai advances and skirmish victories all across the shared border. Cambodia’s initial military actions and responses appear disjointed and arbitrary, with reporting suggesting that Cambodian efforts are affecting civilians more than Thai military personnel.

Regionally, given China’s proximity to each country and the ongoing violence in Myanmar, there are concerns that an expansion to the conflict could draw in new players. Both China and the United States have offered to mediate, but it is uncertain how strategic interests may delay or sway such efforts. Thailand and the U.S. share a longstanding and rigid defense partnership, whereas China’s interests are more ambiguous.

Cambodia has used lower-level diplomats under the cover of the UN to call for a ceasefire, but Thailand has shown no immediate interest in halting hostilities despite claiming a wider conflict will not emerge. President Trump’s recent intervention is likely to progress peace efforts.

Sources: ICJ, ICJ, UNESCO, ICJ, Thairath, Wikipedia (profile), BBC, CNN, Reuters, The Phnom Penh Post

Do you want high-quality content, sourcing, and analysis like this on every brief?

Taiwan Voter Recall Against KMT Legislators Fails

Summary
On 26 July, Taiwan’s “Great Recall” targeting 24 KMT (Kuomintang) opposition legislators failed. As a result, the KMT retains its slim majority in Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan with 52 seats to the ruling DPP’s 51 seats.

Findings

• Background: When President Lai Ching-te (DPP) took office in January 2024, the KMT and Taiwan People’s Party formed a bloc to oppose DPP legislation. One of the big bills that was blocked was a historically large defense spending bill. Opposition to the DPP’s overtly pro-Taiwan and anti-”One China Principle” policies led to allegations that the KMT’s legislators were pro-China or affiliated with the CCP. In 2024, KMT officials visited China and hosted high-level CCP official Wan Huning.
  Following a growing civil movement against the KMT, the DPP scheduled recall votes in an attempt to oust the opposition democratically.

• Great Recall Campaign: On 26 July, Taiwanese voters from 24 KMT-administered districts went to the polls to vote on whether they wanted to retain or remove their representative from office.
  All 24 KMT legislators retained their positions.

• Future Recall Vote: On 23 August 2025, another recall vote will be held for 7 other KMT legislators in separate districts.

Why This Matters
The recall campaign’s failure has solidified a chasm between Taiwan’s ruling parties and the civil democratic base supporting them.

This is a very interesting development for Taiwan, in part due to how its government is structured. The presidential office (which DPP President Lai occupies) controls foreign affairs, defense authorizations, and a broad national strategy. Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan (which has a slim KMT majority) oversees the logistical/administrative side; it passes or blocks laws and budgets.

With a KMT majority, here is what they could do or pursue:

• Block President Lai’s bills (i.e. defense spending amid growing China tensions)

• Dilute pro-independence narrative, organizations, and movements

• Launch hearings and investigations within the government and against retainers of executive power

• Pursue impeachment of censure of cabinet officials

For China, the KMT’s dominant presence allows for pressure on policies that reinforce Taiwanese sovereignty and the defense of Taiwan. Additionally, KMT and CCP influence through cultural exchange, open borders, United Front efforts, media access, etc. allows for China to continue to influence the minds of Taiwan’s civil society; to plant the seeds of pro-China policies and opinions and, ultimately, establish a generation of voters who are open to a “One China Principle.”

Sources: Taipei Times, BBC, NPR

China, Vietnam Launch First-Ever Joint Army Drills

Summary
On 22 July, the first joint drill between China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN) began in the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, China. Global Times reported that the training, scheduled until late July, will focus on joint border patrolling and cooperation.

Findings

• Background: The first-ever army drills are a reflection of growing diplomatic, economic, and security ties between China and Vietnam. When Vietnam’s Tô Lâm assumed the office of General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) in August 2024, Xi Jinping personally hosted him at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing.
  In 2024, China and Vietnam established a “Vietnam-China 3+3 Dialogue,” a diplomatic mechanism for fostering cooperation in diplomacy, defense, and public security.

• Drills: The Global Times reported that the exercise will focus on border patrols and coordination measures, but they will also be based around “four key areas.”

  • Joint Reconnaissance

  • Joint Strikes

  • Joint Rescue

  • Joint Support

  The Global Times also reported that the PLA and PAVN personnel will integrate into fixed units before conducting sustainment operations, reconnaissance and patrols, drone operations, and live-fire drills.

Why This Matters
Vietnam and China continue to have an interesting relationship in the geopolitical space. A bloody history between the two is seemingly being pushed into obscurity, as is China’s persistent “Salami Slicing” in the South China Sea. Both factors would appear to be cause for hostility, which makes the growing relationship between Beijing and Hanoi a near contradiction. But, it suggests Vietnam’s long-standing hedging strategy where leaders in Hanoi appear to be balancing cooperation and competition (especially given Vietnam’s interest in economic and security integration with the United States).

For America’s policymakers, it is not enough to identify Vietnam’s hedging strategy. As China’s military capability has grown, Beijing has also demonstrated an uncanny ability to remove an adversary’s hostility or neutrality and turn them into a partner.

Sources: Global Times, SCMP

End Brief

That concludes this edition of Pacific Weekly.

Reach me anytime: [email protected]

Have a great Sunday.
— Nick