Pacific Weekly #59

Exercise Talisman Sabre 25 begins in Australia, Japan publishes its 2025 defense white paper, and the former South Korean president faces new criminal charges.

Pacific Weekly #59

Good morning and happy Sunday,

This is Pacific Weekly, a premium exclusive of The Intel Brief intended to keep you updated on events across the hotly contested Indo-Pacific region.

Reporting Period: 14-20 July 2025

Bottom-Line Up Front:

1. From 13 July to 4 August, Marines and Sailors with the Marine Rotational Force - Darwin (MRF-D) are conducting exercises with the Australian Army’s 1st Division. The exercise includes airfield seizures, establishing Expeditionary Advanced bases (EABs), airspace control, and joint live-fire exercises (LFEs). Talisman Sabre 25 is the largest iteration to date.

2. On 14 July, the Japanese Ministry of Defense released the Defense of Japan 2025 white paper. The document details fundamental missions and developments for the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF). Japan is particularly concerned about China’s growing military capability, probing activities, and joint operations with Russia and North Korea.

3. On 19 July, former South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol was indicted on additional criminal charges related to his declaration of martial law in December 2024. Yoon is currently facing an insurrection trial, but will now face charges of abuse of authority, fabricating/erasing official documents, and obstructing arrest procedures. He will remain in detention for up to six months as the legal proceedings unfold.

U.S., Australia Conduct Exercise Talisman Sabre 25

Summary
From 13 July to 4 August, Marines and Sailors with the Marine Rotational Force - Darwin (MRF-D) are conducting exercises with the Australian Army’s 1st Division. The exercise includes airfield seizures, establishing Expeditionary Advanced bases (EABs), airspace control, and joint live-fire exercises (LFEs). Talisman Sabre 25 is the largest iteration to date.

Findings

  • Scale and Scope: Australia’s Ministry of Defense called this the largest and most sophisticated iteration of Talisman Sabre to date. Over 35,000 personnel from 19 nations (including Canada, France, Germany, India, Japan, South Korea, and the UK) are joining the U.S. and Australia for operations.

  • Expanded Area of Operations: This year’s exercise includes operations in Queensland, the Northern Territory, Western Australia, New South Wales, Christmas Island, and (for the first time) Papua New Guinea.

  • Noteworthy Events:

    • Joint Forcible Entry: German, French, and U.S. airborne forces conducted a major airdrop near Charters Towers. It was the first-ever French jump in Australia, with U.S. paratroopers deploying vehicles and mortars.

    • AUS–U.S. Firepower Coordination: U.S. Marines and Australian artillery units executed combined live-fire drills (which included the HIMARS rocket artillery), supported by assault support and aviation command and control operations (C2).

    • Recovery Operations: Papua New Guinea hosted a simulated aircraft crash recovery mission involving 2,500 Special Forces from 15 nations. While smart to develop this competency given the Indo-Pacific’s littoral geography, I wonder if this was planned due to Chinese incursions shutting down commercial flights in February 2025.

  • Chinese Response: The CCP-affiliated Global Times reported on the scale and scope of Talisman Sabre 25, and touted that the PLA is likely to observe and shadow the exercise. The PLA has monitored the last four iterations.

Why This Matters
Exercise Talisman Sabre 25 demonstrates that the U.S., Australia, and a widening circle of European and Indo-Pacific partners are not only talking about integrated deterrence but practicing it at scale. Against the backdrop of rising tensions over Taiwan, aggressive maritime coercion in the South China Sea, and Chinese intimidation of Pacific air and sea lanes, TS25 shows that the region is committed to the “free and open Indo-Pacific” concept.

Generally, the scale and scope of this iteration suggest that a NATO-esque coalition is forming in the region. For Canberra, these drills prove Australia’s willingness to shoulder more risk and responsibility for Indo-Pacific security, while providing a forward staging area for U.S. forces should a crisis erupt.

Japanese White Paper Warns Of China’s Growing Military Capability, Probing Activities

Summary
On 14 July, the Japanese Ministry of Defense released the Defense of Japan 2025 white paper. The document details fundamental missions and developments for the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF). Japan is particularly concerned about China’s growing military capability, probing activities, and joint operations with Russia and North Korea.

Findings

  • Layout: The white paper’s layout covers highlights from 2024, before breaking down its approach for the future. There are five parts, but the first two are more directly related to warfighting capabilities:

    • Part I: Security Environment Surrounding Japan: This section styles the current geopolitical environment as the “Greatest Trial of the Postwar Era,” particularly due to the aggressive and increasingly hostile competition in the Indo-Pacific.
      Japan highlighted critical concerns that have exacerbated the global and regional security environment:

      • Russia’s invasion of Ukraine

      • U.S.-China strategic competition

      • North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile development

      • The growing Russia-China alignment

      • The ongoing conflict in the Middle East and the new conflict in Syria

      • Trends in technology and cyberspace

    • Part II: Japan’s Security and Defense Policy: Despite prioritizing the U.S.-Japanese Alliance, Japan retains a diplomacy-first approach to foreign affairs and will continue “maintaining and exclusively defense-oriented policy and not becoming a military power that poses threats to other countries.”
      To ensure its defensive capabilities and deterrence, Japan has outlined “Seven Functions and Capabilities” to improve.

Why This Matters
Despite Japan’s insistence on defensive military action and a diplomacy-first approach to foreign affairs, the white paper suggests a departure from that mindset.

If we look at the graphics, the first, which displays Japan’s whole warfighting concept, and the second, which outlines the JSDF’s developmental focus, we see proof of Japan’s intent to improve its stand-off capability as well as assault and logistics support. It is my assessment that these developments, while defensive, are to deter or counter China’s designs on Taiwan. And, should such a conflict develop, these new capabilities would help facilitate an American-led reentry into the First Island Chain.

While Japan’s plan ultimately improves the U.S.-led alliance’s capacity to counter China, it does not appear to have an answer for Russia’s growing role in the region or its support for China. Additionally, it does not account for the growing unpredictability of North Korea and Pyongyang’s missile program.

Former South Korean President Faces New Charges

Summary
On 19 July, former South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol was indicted on additional criminal charges related to his declaration of martial law in December 2024. Yoon is currently facing an insurrection trial, but will now face charges of abuse of authority, fabricating/erasing official documents, and obstructing arrest procedures. He will remain in detention for up to six months as the legal proceedings unfold.

Findings

  • Background: On 3 December 2024, President Yoon declared martial law in South Korea, where he mobilized law enforcement and military personnel. That evening, Korean members of parliament rushed to the National Assembly. While protestors clashed with enforcers in Seoul, 190 of 300 parliament members quickly passed a resolution and demanded Yoon lift the order. 155 minutes after declaring martial law, Yoon lifted the order.
    The incident was styled as a coup, South Korea’s first since 1961 and a major regression in the young democracy (South Korea has only been governed democratically since 1988).
    On 14 December 2024, Yoon was impeached from office. On 4 April 2025, Yoon was formally removed from office.

  • New Charges: The special prosecutor has added counts against Yoon for unilaterally bypassing full Cabinet approval, creating and deleting a false document to satisfy martial‑law conditions, and interfering with the execution of arrest warrants.

  • Jail Extension: Yoon has been re-arrested and returned to detention, as authorities fear he may destroy evidence. He had briefly been released in March due to procedural issues.

  • Insurrection Case: Yoon is already on trial for insurrection over his attempt to mobilize troops and police against the opposition-led National Assembly, charges that could lead to life imprisonment or execution. Investigations now include former military and police officials involved in the martial‑law attempt. Yoon’s team denies wrongdoing, claiming the process is politically motivated.

Why This Matters
The deepening criminal case against former President Yoon Suk Yeol exposes how fragile the guardrails of South Korea’s democracy are. Yoon’s rapid move to declare martial law arguably shattered decades of political precedent in a democracy that has, in recent memory, prided itself on civil control of the military and peaceful transfers of power.

While his impeachment and subsequent indictment are, at the surface, signs of justice and accountability, the incident also shows South Korea’s deep factional divides and political narrative building.

Equally concerning is what this crisis reveals about the potential politicization of security and intelligence services. Yoon’s ability to rapidly mobilize military and police assets for domestic suppression suggests possible gaps in oversight and signals to future leaders that the machinery of national security could be turned inward under the wrong conditions.

End Brief

That concludes this edition of Pacific Weekly.

Thank you for reading! And happy Sunday.

— Nick

This publication is an Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) product and does not contain Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) or Classified Information.