Good morning and happy Sunday,

This is Pacific Weekly, a special edition of The Intel Brief intended to keep you updated on events across the hotly contested Indo-Pacific region.

Reporting Period: 16-22 June 2025

Bottom-Line Up Front:

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USS Nimitz Among Assets Departing Pacific For Middle East

Summary
From 16–21 June 2025, the U.S. Navy significantly realigned forces from the Pacific theatre to the Middle East in response to escalating Israel–Iran hostilities. The USS Nimitz aircraft carrier, already underway, replaced the Carl Vinson in the Arabian Sea. Concurrently, several Pacific-based vessels transitioned or departed deployment zones, reducing U.S. forward presence amid Indo-Pacific security considerations.

Findings

• USS Nimitz Deployment: Beginning 16 June, CVN-68 Nimitz diverted from the South China Sea—canceling its Danang port call—and transited west via the Malacca and Singapore Straits to replace CVN-70 Carl Vinson in the Middle East. This marks the second U.S. carrier in the Arabian Sea, reinforcing deterrence amid Israel–Iran missile exchanges.

• Destroyer Thomas Hudner Redeployment: The guided-missile destroyer Thomas Hudner, capable of ballistic missile defense, departed the western Mediterranean and repositioned to the eastern Mediterranean near Israel.

• USS George Washington From Yokosuka: On 16 June, USS George Washington (CVN-73) left Yokosuka, Japan, entering the Philippine Sea for ongoing operations—all observed via USNI's tracker.

• USS Blue Ridge Leaves Guam: On 14–17 June, the 7th Fleet command ship USS Blue Ridge (LCC‑19) departed Guam after a rare port visit.

• USS America Departed Sydney: On 17 June, the amphibious assault ship USS America (LHA-6) left Sydney following a 7th Fleet port visit; USS San Diego (LPD‑22) and USS Rushmore (LSD‑47) concurrently transited through Australian waters.

• Patrol and Replenishment Operations: Between 16–18 June, U.S. destroyers Lenah Sutcliffe Higbee and Shoup conducted replenishments and flight ops in the Philippine Sea—signaling continued U.S. presence despite asset shifts.

Why This Matters
The rapid redeployment of U.S. Navy assets to the Middle East suggests an escalation (and growing role for the U.S.) in the Israel–Iran conflict. While boosting CENTCOM capabilities in the region, the Navy’s pivot reduces distributed force posture in the Indo‑Pacific, where Chinese naval incursions and littoral aggressions persist.

Regional partners, such as Japan and the Philippines, may interpret this as reduced U.S. commitment, potentially emboldening the PLA to continue and accelerate its hybrid tactics at contested islands in the South China Sea. The DoD should assess the risk of diminished forward presence in Asia and consider compensatory force deployments to maintain balance amid competing global demands.

Sources: U.S. Navy, U.S. Navy, USNI News, Navy Times, Navy Times, Politico

Xi Jinping Attends China-Central Asia Summit In Kazakhstan

Summary
From 16–17 June, President Xi Jinping convened the second China–Central Asia Summit in Astana, signing a “Treaty of Permanent Good‑Neighbourliness and Friendly Cooperation” with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. China pledged grant assistance, deepened Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) ties, elevated connectivity, and bolstered security collaboration, signaling Beijing’s strategic pivot into Central Asia.

Findings

• High‑Level Attendance: Xi and the five Central Asian heads of state ratified the treaty, emphasizing legally enshrined long‑term cooperation across trade, energy, infrastructure, and security.

• Economic Engagement: China pledged ¥1.5 billion (~USD 209 million) in grants to support regional development initiatives. Bilateral trade reached a record ¥286 billion (USD 40 billion) through May 2025—a 10 % year‑on‑year increase. Kazakhstan contributes nearly half of this trade volume.

• Infrastructure Projects: Summit endorsed accelerated construction of the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway and expansion of road, rail, port, and aviation links. Visa facilitation measures and plans for consular expansions were announced to boost cross‑border mobility.

• Belt and Road Initiative Expansion: Xi emphasized "high‑quality" BRI cooperation including desertification control, education exchange, poverty alleviation, and trade facilitation centers. Four new cooperation centres were launched covering poverty, education, desertification, and trade

• Security and Law Enforcement: The Astana Declaration reaffirmed commitments to resolve disputes peacefully, combat terrorism, extremism, cross‑border crime, and cyber‑threats. Bilateral security commitments were expanded, including joint counter‑terrorism training under SCO frameworks 

Why This Matters
Beijing’s summit—hosted outside China for the first time—signals a decisive effort to deepen economic and strategic influence in Central Asia, traditionally within Russia’s sphere. With major infrastructure projects and economic grants, China is positioning itself as a long‑term partner, reducing Moscow’s sway and creating alternative Eurasian access routes essential for resource and trade resilience. This enhanced China‑Central Asia partnership supports Beijing’s broader vision for a multipolar world and may reshape regional alignments across energy, transport corridors, and security ecosystems. NATO and U.S. policymakers should monitor evolving Chinese influence in a region critical to global trade and great‑power competition.

Sources: Al Jazeera, Global Times, Reuters, News Central Asia, Beijing Review

U.S. Army Conducts Exercise Talisman Sabre 2025

Summary
On 13 June, the U.S. Army began exercise Talisman Sabre 2025. The exercise, which runs until 4 August, includes more than 35,000 personnel. Training will be conducted between U.S., Australian, and international partners in Australia and Papua New Guinea.

Findings

• Background: The Talisman Sabre exercise has been conducted biennially since 2005. It is the U.S. Army’s largest exercise with Australian forces.

• Purpose: Talisman Sabre is the pinnacle of U.S.-Australian security relations. The exercise is intended to perpetuate the unique security relationship, but also ensure both forces can conduct sustained combat operations in austere environments together.

• Scale: More than 35,000 personnel are participating in the exercise, making it one of the largest iterations to date. In addition to the U.S. joint forces, personnel from the following nations are participating:

  • Fiji, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, South Korea, Thailand, Tonga, Singapore, and the UK.

  • Notably, the UK’s Carrier Strike Group 25 is participating.

• Scope: The U.S. Army states there will be a large-scale field training exercise which includes:

  • Force preparation, theater-specific sustainment activities, amphibious landings, land force maneuvers, urban operations, air operations, maritime operations, and space and special activities.

Why This Matters
Talisman Sabre 2025 reflects the growing importance of multinational military interoperability in deterring Chinese aggression across the Indo-Pacific. The exercise demonstrates not only the depth of U.S.–Australian security ties but also the ability to employ the forces of a broad coalition in the Indo-Pacific region.

The inclusion of NATO and non-NATO members suggests a growing strategic alignment in response to China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea and Western Pacific. For U.S. national security, Talisman Sabre 2025 is a key opportunity to rehearse sustained joint operations, validate logistics networks, and stress-test coalition command structures ahead of potential crises in the region.

Sources: U.S. Army

Taiwan Schedules Recall Elections For Opposition Lawmakers

Summary
On 20 June, Reuters reported that Taiwan’s Central Election Commission scheduled a recall vote for 24 Kuomintang (KMT) lawmakers. The vote is scheduled for 26 July 2025. The recalls, fueled by public backlash and supported by the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), could temporarily shift legislative control and impact national policy, particularly on defense and China relations.

Findings

• Scope: Recall votes target 24 opposition KMT lawmakers out of 113 Legislative Yuan seats. A successful recall requires a majority of votes in favor and turnout from at least 25% of eligible voters. By-elections for vacated seats would follow, likely before the next general election in 2028.

• Balance of Power at Risk: The KMT currently holds 62 seats; the DPP holds 51. Successful recalls of 12 or more KMT lawmakers would shift control to the DPP. Winning six more seats in subsequent by-elections could secure a legislative majority for the ruling party through 2028.

• Political Context: Civic groups initiated the recall campaigns in response to budget cuts and legislative reforms led by the KMT–TPP coalition that DPP critics say undermines defense and governance effectiveness. The DPP has branded the recalls as essential to block KMT efforts to tilt Taiwan toward Beijing.
  Through the political and legislative controversies, multiple KMT officials have been accused of collaborating with the Chinese Communist Party, or pursuing interests considered pro-Beijing.

• Opposition Resistance: KMT and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) have launched “no” campaigns, calling the recall a partisan power grab and defending their stance as reducing cross-strait tensions. The KMT opposition argues that legislative reforms were lawful and necessary.

Why This Matters
The recall votes offer a rare opportunity to reshape Taiwan’s parliamentary landscape mid-term, and if successful, relentlessly pursue legislation that KMT officials have blocked, such as an increased defense budget.

A DPP majority would enable stronger legislative support for President Lai Ching‑te’s defense and China-deterring agenda—key priorities amid heightened PLA pressure. It would also allow mainstream Taiwanese politics to pursue a stance rejecting the “One China” principle.

Conversely, failure to recall could solidify KMT restraint on defense spending and Beijing policy. For U.S. and allied security planners, the outcome could influence Taiwan’s readiness and ability to withstand cross-strait coercion. The votes also signal how civil society mobilization can directly influence strategic direction in semi-democratic contexts.

Sources: Reuters, Focus Taiwan, Taiwan News

End Brief

That concludes this edition of Pacific Weekly.

Thank you for reading!

Nick