Good morning,

Welcome back to another Monday morning edition of The Intel Brief. Let’s review some interesting updates from the weekend.

Reporting Period: October 23-27, 2025

Bottom-Line Up Front:

European Union Approves 19th Sanctions Package On Russia

Summary
On October 23, the European Union confirmed that a 19th sanctions package targeting Russia was adopted by member states. The package reportedly targets Russian economic sectors that are critical to the Kremlin’s “war economy.” The package also takes increased measures against Russian LNG exports and Moscow’s illicit “shadow fleet.”

Findings
The package, adopted on October 23, includes 69 new individual listings and restrictive measures targeting the sectors that support Russia’s wartime economy (European Council). These sanctions also target 45 third-party and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) that act as enablers (European Council). Of note are Belarus, China, and Kazakhstan.

The details:

• Targeting Russia’s Energy Sector: As of January 1, 2027, Russian Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) contracts will be banned in the EU (EU Commission).
  Transactions with Rosneft and Gazprom, two of Russia’s largest energy exporters, are banned despite “the import of oil from third countries” being exempted (EU Commission).
  Some third-party refiners, two of which are in China, are being sanctioned (EU Commission).
  Additionally, 117 new vessels have been added to the list of Russian “shadow fleet” vessels, totaling 557 (EU Commission). These sanction-skirting vessels are subject to port bans. This also includes sanctions on “shadow fleet enablers,” such as trading companies in Hong Kong and the UAE (EU Commission).

• Targeting Russia’s Finance Sector: The EU confirmed that 5 new Russian banks are barred from conducting transactions in Europe (EU Commission). Additionally, the EU has expanded bans on the Russian payment systems used to circumvent transaction bans, such as Mir, SBP, and SPFS (EU Commission). The new measures also include bans on Ruble-backed cryptocurrencies and five Central Asian banks (EU Commission).

• Targeting Russia’s Trade: The EU confirmed that “businesspersons and companies” central to Russia’s military-industrial sectors are subject to asset freezes and bans (EU Commission). The export restrictions also include some dual-use (i.e. commercial products with military applications) items and technologies, as well as metals, salts, and ores (EU Commission).

•  Special Measures: The new package also includes measures that target Russia’s Special Economic Zones (SEZs), which are designed to attract foreign investment (EU Commission). The EU has also extended bans to some of Russia’s digital financial and AI services (EU Commission). Finally, the measure expands travel restrictions and registration for Russian diplomats and state agents (EU Commission).

• U.S. Measures: On October 22, the United States Department of the Treasury announced sanctions on Rosneft and Lukoil, a policy shift welcomed by the EU (U.S. Treasury, CNBC)

Why This Matters
Only time will tell how effective these sanctions will be. Being the 19th package, there is reason to believe their value is greater for media, narrative, and morale purposes. However, tightening controls on Russia’s economic and trading sectors, especially to sanction-skirting actors and organizations, is likely to damage Russia’s leading revenue streams and wartime supply chains.

It is also likely that these sanctions, given their timing with U.S. economic and diplomatic measures, are intended to pressure Putin to return to the negotiating table.

While the ban of Russian LNG is a wartime victory for Ukraine and a blow to Moscow, Europe will now have to establish a replacement for its energy needs. While this is likely to involve the United States, Europe has in some ways “shown its hand,” meaning Trump could open aggressive negotiations with Brussels or turn to bilateral negotiations. It is also very likely that Europe will pay a premium for energy that, through third parties, may be coming from Russia or a strategic adversary anyway.

U.S. Expands Deployments To Southern Command Amid Anti-Cartel Operations

Summary
The United States has increased pressure on Venezuela and Colombia in support of anti-cartel operations. Recent measures from Washington include sanctions, an exercise in Trinidad and Tobago, and the redeployment of the Ford Carrier Strike Group to the region. President Trump recently suggested that U.S. forces could soon strike cartel positions inside Venezuela.

Findings

• Background: The United States has continued to conduct strikes on alleged cartel vessels transiting the Caribbean (The Intel Brief). U.S. forces deployed to the region have conducted at least 10 strikes on such vessels (Yahoo, The Intel Brief). On October 24, the U.S. Treasury instituted economic sanctions on Colombian President Petro, and has rejected negotiations with Venezuela (U.S. Treasury). President Trump recently stated that there will soon be strikes on the ground in Venezuela (Axios).

• Trinidad and Tobago Deployment: On October 26, the USS Gravely arrived in Trinidad and Tobago “for a joint exercise near the coast of Venezuela” (Yahoo, Sunday Express). The USS Gravely is expected to depart from Port of Spain on Thursday, October 30, after supporting U.S. Marines conducting an exercise with local forces (Yahoo).

• Ford Carrier Strike Group: On Friday, October 24, the Gerald Ford Carrier Strike Group was redeployed from the Mediterranean to the Southern Command area of operations (WSJ, Yahoo).

Why This Matters
The rapid buildup of assets in the SOUTHCOM AOR suggests an imminent escalation to the ongoing anti-cartel military operations. The buildup is reminiscent of similar deployments to the Middle East before the U.S. conducted Operation Midnight Hammer against Iran.

It is not certain if Washington will order land strikes on the cartels, but the continued deployment of assets suggests two things:

• A growing capability to conduct widespread strikes and, if necessary, ship to shore operations.

• A growing suggestion to the regimes that are soft on cartels that they should reverse those policies.

Russian Envoy Meets With U.S. Counterpart Following Sanctions Pressure

Summary
On October 24, Russia’s presidential special envoy, Kirill Dmitriev, met with U.S. special envoy Steve Witkoff in Miami, Florida. The meeting was reportedly in response to U.S. economic sanctions on Russia’s oil giants. Dmitriev called for continued diplomatic dialogue and stated a “diplomatic solution” in Ukraine could soon be reached.

Findings

• Background: On October 22, the U.S. Treasury announced new sanctions on Lukoil and Rosneft, Russia’s two largest oil companies (U.S. Treasury, CNBC). The EU recently issued its 19th sanctions package, which included similar measures against Russia’s wartime economy (see above brief).

• Envoy Meeting: On October 24, Kirill Dmitriev met with Steve Witkoff in Miami (POLITICO). The meeting, which was reportedly scheduled before the new sanctions were implemented, was likely to discuss U.S.-Russian economic and diplomatic relations in the event of a peace deal with Ukraine (POLITICO). The sanctions are very likely to have changed the agenda of the meeting.

  • Future Diplomacy: Despite the new sanctions and the postponement of a meeting between Trump and Putin in Hungary, Dmitriev stated in an interview with CNN that a “diplomatic solution” in Ukraine is likely (CNN). However, Dmitriev suggested that the U.S. and Russia maintain diplomacy, suggesting Russia may continue using negotiations as coercive tools to enhance its political prestige, anger and confuse Western partners, and disjoint cooperative efforts regarding Ukraine’s defense.

Why This Matters
The sanctions pressure marks an interesting shift by Trump, who appears “fed up” with Russia’s lack of progress regarding peace negotiations. The sanctions and backroom diplomacy between envoys also suggest Russia is looking for relief, and may entertain a peace deal to do so.

It should also be noted that recent support for Ukraine, such as the Mirage fighter deal, a supply of air defense and drone munitions, and new PURL support, are all long-term. For example, the procurement of Mirage fighters will not be completed until 2027 or 2028 at the earliest.

These developments simply suggest that Ukraine, looking to build its future deterrence to guarantee its sovereignty, may truly be entertaining Russia’s current peace offer (i.e. surrender Donetsk and Luhansk to Moscow and retain the other contested oblasts).

End Brief

That concludes this brief. Thank you for reading!
— Nick