Good morning,

This is your Monday morning brief. Let’s go over the critical updates from this weekend.

Reporting Period: 28 August - 1 September 2025

Bottom-Line Up Front:

Russia-Ukraine Peace Process Continues To Stall

Summary
On 29 August, German Chancellor Merz told an interviewer with Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen (ZDF) that he is “mentally preparing” for the war in Ukraine to “drag on for a long time.” Merz also La Chaine Info that due to hybrid warfare operations, he considers Germany already “in conflict with Russia.” The United States announced new Foreign Military Sales to Kyiv. Russian hybrid warfare schemes, battlefield developments, and continued military aid to Ukraine suggest Russia and Ukraine may not reach a ceasefire or peace agreement in 2025.

Findings

• Background: Following the Alaska Summit between Putin and Trump, the White House Summit between Trump, Zelenskyy, and European leaders, and Russia issuing demands for peace, all indications suggest a ceasefire is currently unlikely without American diplomatic momentum.
  Additionally, the upcoming “Zapad” exercise between Belarus and Russia should not be discounted as an opportunity for Russia to open new offensive fronts.

• Merz’s Remarks: Despite a unified effort by the United States and Europe, increased NATO support, and persistent aid to Ukraine, Chancellor Merz does not feel a ceasefire between Moscow and Kyiv will be reached in 2025. Merz stated that while efforts to establish a ceasefire via peace negotiations are ongoing, Germany—and likely Europe as a whole—does not support a deal “at the price of Ukraine’s capitulation.”
  Merz also told French media outlet La Chaine Info that he considers Germany and Russia to be “in conflict” due to Russian hybrid warfare schemes in Germany, especially sabotage.

• Russian Hybrid Warfare: Since the start of the war in Ukraine, various European intelligence agencies warned of Russian hybrid warfare schemes, such as industrial and infrastructure sabotage, influence campaigns, propaganda and misinformation operations, and political interference. On 31 August, CSIS published an infographic depicting Russian hybrid warfare activity in Europe since January 2018, with many operations affecting critical infrastructure. CSIS claimed that Russian sabotage operations quadrupled from 2023 to 2024.

• Battlefield Updates: On 30 August, the BBC reported that Russia had launched another large-scale drone and missile attack on Ukraine. The attack included 540 drones and 45 missiles, which hit targets in the Dnipropetrovsk oblast, a region in Russia’s offensive focus. At the same time, Kyiv reportedly coordinated drone strikes on refineries in Krasnodar and Syrzan, Russia.
  General Gerasimov stated that Russia maintains the “strategic initiative” due to continued success of offensive operations in Ukraine.

• Aid to Ukraine: While NATO continues to provide military aid to Ukraine through its Comprehensive Assistance Package (CAP framework, and European allies provide support bilaterally, the United States has also suddenly increased its contributions.
  On 29 August, the U.S. Department of State announced nearly $330 million in new Foreign Military Sales to Ukraine, which includes a sustainment package for Patriot systems and equipment to facilitate satellite communications.

Why This Matters
The stalled peace process underscores the widening gap between diplomatic efforts and battlefield realities. Russia’s hybrid warfare in Europe raises the risk of escalation beyond Ukraine, particularly as sabotage operations increasingly target NATO states. Merz’s statement that Germany is already “in conflict” with Russia signals a shift in European political discourse toward openly acknowledging confrontation, which could drive NATO toward deeper involvement.

Take a look at NATO’s eastern flank, for example, for further evidence that diplomatic and security relationships are worsening between NATO and Russia. Finland, Poland, and the Baltic states, for example, are all enhancing their defensive posture and capabilities in preparation for a conflict with Russia.

The continued U.S. military aid packages suggest Washington is preparing for a prolonged conflict as well. If diplomacy continues to falter, the Trump administration may commit to a maximum pressure campaign against Russia and its partners by implementing sanctions and increasing aid to Ukraine.

The U.S.-led order needs to be wary of this reality as it pushes for terms and peace between Moscow and Kyiv. The more Russia progresses its battlefield goals while embracing high-level diplomacy, only to skirt real, substantial treaties or agreements, the more it appears that Russia’s only intent is to enhance its prestige; to delay, to build partnerships and coerce its way back into old ones.

Sources: POLITICO, The Kyiv Post, Reuters, ABC News, BBC, DSCA, DSCA

Putin Visits China Ahead Of WWII Ceremony; Deepening Strategic Ties With China

Summary
On 30 August, Russian President Putin arrived in China to visit with Chinese paramount Leader Xi Jinping. Putin’s visit will include participation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit and a parade for victory during World War II. Putin’s visit was preceded by joint Russian-Chinese military patrols, and a visit to China from Russia’s chairman of the state Duma.

Findings

• Background: Before Putin’s visit to China, various military and diplomatic engagements were planned to reinforce the growing strategic relationship between Russia and China:

  • Greater Security Cooperation: On 25 August, the chairman of Russia’s State Duma (like a European Parliament or the House of Representatives) traveled to Beijing. On 26 August, Chairman Volodin met with Xi Jinping. According to Reuters, the Chinese leader stated that Russia and China “should jointly safeguard their security and development interests.”

  • Annual Patrols: On 20 August, the Russian Navy and People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) concluded their fifth joint naval patrol in the Sea of Japan. USNI News reports that the patrols were a 2025 iteration of annual patrols between Moscow and Beijing.

• Putin’s Visit to China: On 30 August, Putin traveled to China for a diplomatic visit, which is expected to last nearly a week. Putin will attend the SCO Summit in Tianjin, China, as well as the Victory Day parade in Beijing on 3 September. Putin is expected to be Xi’s guest of honor at the parade.
  Core to Xi’s and Putin’s relationship is the “no limits” interpretation of strategic cooperation between Beijing and Moscow, which includes deeper integration on security, international diplomacy, and energy, for example.

  • Previous Visit: Xi Jinping visited Moscow from 7 to 10 May for Russia’s Victory Day parade.

Why This Matters
Putin’s visit to China, timed alongside the SCO Summit and Beijing’s Victory Day parade, is as much about symbolism as it is about strategy. It suggests that Russia and China are investing in the expansion of their partnership, presenting themselves as the leaders of a new, multipolar world that pushes back against U.S. dominance. For Russia, China remains a critical lifeline while sanctions cut off Western ties. For China, Russia adds an extra layer of backing as it pushes its agenda in the South China Sea and broader Indo-Pacific, making it more difficult for the U.S. and its allies to respond with a clear, unified strategy.

The parade and speeches hammer home a narrative of resisting Western financial and political influence, while the SCO summit gives Putin room to widen Russia’s circle—especially with India, which is trying to balance U.S. trade ties along with its tense relationship with Beijing.

In the bigger picture, closer ties between Moscow and Beijing make it harder for the West to isolate Russia and give China more room to assert itself regionally. Together, they’re shaping global forums, building alternative institutions, and shifting power dynamics across Eurasia in ways that directly challenge U.S. influence.

Sources: The Guardian, USNI News, Reuters

U.S. Deployment Near Venezuela Continues

Summary
In mid-August 2025, the U.S. Navy deployed assets to the Caribbean, near Venezuela, to conduct anti-trafficking and anti-cartel operations. Venezuela responded by mobilizing militia and conventional forces, including naval assets, into a defensive posture. As of 30 August, U.S. Navy assets continue to enter the region.

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Findings

• U.S. Navy Deployments: On 29 August, the U.S. Navy deployed at least seven warships. The deployment includes guided-missile destroyers, at least one submarine, and roughly 5,000 personnel, including U.S. Marines.
  The deployment is officially framed as an operation to support counter-narcotics operations in South America, which includes cartels linked to the Maduro regime in Venezuela.

• Venezuelan Response: President Maduro responded by mobilizing more than four million militia members and deploying 15,000 conventional troops, armored vehicles, artillery, and naval assets.

Why This Matters
While an American invasion of Venezuela is unlikely given the force size and posture, the situation has sharply escalated tensions between the U.S. and the Maduro regime. The U.S. does not recognize Maduro’s reign as legitimate and openly seeks the removal of the de facto leader (the U.S. has a $50 million bounty on Maduro).

Some media are framing the deployment as a power projection into the region due to America’s historic influence in the Western Hemisphere. What is interesting is that Russia proposed the deployment of Russian-made air defense systems to Venezuela, while Maduro asked China to take a bigger role in the region. All this is to suggest that while a conflict is unlikely, it could be ushering in (or accelerating) the great power competition in South America, especially as the U.S. is seeking its domain over the Panama Canal from Beijing.

Sources: The Atlantic Council, CBS News, Axios

End Brief

That concludes this brief. Nice and short.

Thanks for reading! Have a great week.
— Nick