Good morning,

This is the Monday morning edition of The Intel Brief—Let’s review what happened over the weekend!

Reporting Period: 18-22 September 2025

Bottom-Line Up Front:

PUBLICATION UPDATE: Due to my wedding and honeymoon, there will be limited publications from 27 September to 6 October. Thanks for understanding!

EU Pushes For 19th Russian Sanctions Package Amid Aerial Incursions, Kremlin War Rhetoric

Summary
On 18 September, the European Union advanced its 19th Russian sanctions package in response to escalating aerial incursions into NATO aispace. The measures target Russia’s financial system, energy exports, and sanction-evasion networks, with provisions including a ban on LNG imports by 2027 and the closure of loopholes for Rosneft and Gazprom. These incidents have led to Estonia invoking NATO Article 4, the second time in two weeks.

Findings

• EU Sanctions Proposal: On 18 September, EU Commission President von der Leyen announced the 19th sanctions package against Russia (EU Commission). The package, due to Russia’s aerial incursions against NATO members and a lack of interest in peace efforts, targets Moscow’s energy exports, financial loopholes, and companies providing Russia with war material (EU Commission). On 19 September, High Representative and Vice President Kallas of the Diplomatic Service of the European Union confirmed the details (EEAS):

  • Full transaction ban on Russian banks and financial institutions, including in third countries, such as China and India (and likely North Korea).

  • “Adding large economic operators” to control Russia’s sanction-skirting efforts.

  • Ban on investments in Russian Special Economic Zones (These are privileged markets and companies, designated by the Russian government under Federal Law #116 FZ, designed to incentivize foreign investment) (Russian Trade Delegation to the UK).

  • Full prohibition of Russian LNG imports by January 2027.

  • Lifting exemptions to Rosneft and Gazprom, Russia’s largest energy conglomerates.

  • Expanding sanctions to Russia’s shadow fleet.

• Estonia Incursion: On 19 September, Estonia’s Foreign Ministry confirmed that three Russian MiG-31 multirole fighters entered Estonian airspace without permission, and lingered for “12 minutes” (BBC). A NATO spokesperson stated that NATO aircraft “responded immediately and intercepted” the fighters (BBC). NATO Allied Command Operations headquarters confirmed that Italian F-35s, Swedish, and Finnish aircraft conducted the intercept (CNN). Those aircraft are in Estonia to participate in Eastern Sentry.

  Estonia reportedly requested NATO Article 4 consultations, the second time in two weeks this request has been made (The Guardian).

• Baltic Sea Incursion: On 19 September, Eurofighter Typhoon multirole fighters with Tactical Air Wing 73, operating under NATO’s Quick Reaction Alert status, intercepted a Russian Ilyushin IL-20M communications and electronic intelligence aircraft (German Delegation to NATO).

Why This Matters
Some background first: Last week, Poland and Romania both experienced unprovoked Russian drone incursions over their territory. In Poland, some of those drones were shot down by ground-based and aerial platforms. In Romania, those drones were intercepted by Romanian aircraft before departing the airspace. As a result, Poland invoked NATO Article 4, which summons members for an emergency consultation (the last time this was done was during the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine).

As a result, NATO launches the “Eastern Sentry” activity, a pseudo joint exercise as well as an active deterrence force.

Now, continued incursions and a lack of diplomatic effort in Moscow are rapidly deteriorating and progress that was made towards peace negotiations, with European powers growing more weary that continued Russian hybrid warfare will lead to a conflict.

The EU’s sanctions package could be a good thing if approved, but a litmus test will be the kind of support it gets from typical detractors like Slovakia and Hungary.

Russia’s behaviors are being framed as tests of NATO responses, tactics, and disposition, but they are also a reflection of Russia’s long-term intentions in Ukraine. These behaviors, because they are deteriorating the diplomatic progress that was made in August, suggest Russia is looking to establish a new status quo with Europe; a pseudo conflict where hybrid warfare tactics are commonplace, and war in Ukraine persists as Russia inches closer to its territorial ambitions there.

Iran Suspends IAEA Cooperation, Certain To Continue Nuclear Development

Summary
On 20 September, Iran’s top national security body confirmed that it would suspend cooperation with the UN’s IAEA. The decision was reportedly due to E3 nations triggering snapback sanctions in late August. Now, a nuclear deal with Tehran seems very unlikely.

Findings

• Background: In late August, E3 officials (Britain, France, and Germany) initiated the “snapback” mechanism, which triggered reimposing UN sanctions on Iran, due to Tehran’s noncompliance with the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), and a failure to establish a new nuclear deal (The Intel Brief).
  On 3 September, Iran proposes adherence to the 2015 JCPOA so long as all original signatories (including the United States) returned to the deal (The Intel Brief).
  On 19 September, the UN Security Council did not adopt a resolution to extend sanctions relief to Iran under the 2015 JCPOA terms, and both Russia and China stated they would not adhere to the sanctions (X).
  Snapback sanctions are expected to be implemented this month.

• Suspending IAEA Cooperation: On 20 September, Iran’s Supreme National Security Council stated it will suspend cooperation with the UN’s International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the body responsible for conducting inspections to verify JCPOA compliance (WION). Iran stated that the decision was made due to E3 members triggering the snapback sanction mechanism (WION). In July, Iran’s president signed a law allowing for Tehran’s withdrawal from cooperative programs with the IAEA, indicating a long-term plan to continue a nuclear weapons program regardless of high-level diplomatic meetings (CNN).

Why This Matters
The E3 group was attempting to establish a new nuclear deal with Iran to—in the long term—stabilize the region in the hopes of achieving a diplomatic denuclearization. Instead, with no deal being made and no sign of talks continuing, Iran’s continued nuclearization only increases the likelihood of future strikes like the American Operation Midnight Hammer.

President Trump Suggests U.S. Reacquire Bagram Air Base In Afghanistan

Summary
President Donald Trump has publicly renewed a push to regain control of Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan, which the U.S. military relinquished in 2021. Trump cited the base’s strategic importance—especially its proximity to China—and warned of unspecified consequences if the Taliban government does not accede. The Taliban have firmly rejected the proposal, invoking Afghan sovereignty and existing agreements (such as the Doha Agreement), and insisting that no U.S. military presence will be restored. Afghan officials also argue any engagement with the U.S. should be limited to political and economic relations.

Findings

• Trump’s Statement: During his visit to the United Kingdom, and speaking alongside Prime Minister Starmer, President Trump stated that his administration may pursue the reclamation and use of Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan (Reuters). Trump also stated on social media that “bad things” would happen if the Taliban government rejected the idea (AP News).

• Taliban Response: Taliban spokesman Mujahid denied Trump’s request and stated that Afghanistan’s sovereignty is “non-negotiable” (POLITICO). Taliban officials prefer to have a diplomatic and economic relationship with the United States, with security cooperation off the table. The Afghan Foreign Ministry also stated a renewed U.S. military presence is Afghanistan is undesirable and unacceptable (AP News).

Why This Matters
Re-establishing a U.S. presence at Bagram would mark a striking reversal of the post-2021 U.S. withdrawal policy and would have significant strategic, diplomatic, and operational implications. Strategically, controlling Bagram grants the U.S. a high-capacity air hub close to key regional areas—enhancing reach over Central Asia, Afghanistan, and even portions of China’s western frontier. It would also enable enhanced counterterrorism operations, potentially improving the U.S.’ ability to monitor and respond to extremist threats like Islamic State Khorasan.

Despite offering a good strategic position, the re-entry of U.S. troops to Afghanistan without Taliban cooperation or approval would very likely lead to a resumption of the failed Afghan campaign.

End Brief

That concludes this brief.

Thank you for reading!
— Nick