Good morning,

This is the Monday morning edition of The Intel Brief. In this premium edition, we are going to cover some interesting updates from the weekend. Let’s begin.

Reporting Period: 17-21 July 2025

Bottom-Line Up Front:

EU Adopts 18th Russian Sanctions Package

Summary
On 18 July, the European Council adopted the 18th sanctions package targeting Russia. The measures target Russia’s energy, banking, and defense sectors as well as trade with the EU. The package also includes further measures on Belarus to close sanction loopholes.

Findings
The European Council agreed to 55 new sanctions listings, which target 14 individuals and 41 entities. The major items:

• Russian Energy Sector: The EU is lowering the price cap for crude oil to $47.6/barrel from $60/barrel. Europe is banning 105 vessels associated with Russia’s shadow fleet from ports and various maritime services, bringing the total to 444 vessels. More Russian entities and individuals will be subject to asset freezing, travel bans, and import/export restrictions. The measures also introduce a ban on refined petroleum products, but make exceptions for specified third-party refiners (Canada, Norway, Switzerland, the UK, and the U.S.). The EU is imposing a “full transaction ban” on Nord Stream 1 and 2, which will delay or halt its completion and operation.

• Russian Banking Sector: The Council has expanded transaction bans to 22 other Russian banks, bringing the total to 45. The EU will also target banks and firms (including crypto agencies) that help Russia bypass these measures through the System for Transfer of Financial Messages (SPFS). All transactions with the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) and associated firms are banned.

• Russian Defense Sector: The EU added full sanctions on suppliers to Russia’s defense sector, including three Chinese companies and eight in Belarus. Additionally, 26 entities providing dual-use goods and technologies for Russia’s defense sector will be restricted. Of those 26, 11 are from third countries (7 in China, 4 in Turkey). New export bans worth €2.5 billion now cover CNC machines, propellant chemicals, and more.

• Listings Prior to 18th Package Approval: On 15 July, the EU also identified 9 individuals and 6 entities who are “responsible for destabilising actions in the EU and Ukraine,” which include the Russian Television and Radio Broadcasting Network (RTRS), the 841st Separate Electronic Warfare Center, the BRICS Journalists Association, and the Center for Geopolitical Expertise.

Why This Matters
This latest sanctions package demonstrates that, more than two years into Russia’s full-scale invasion, the EU is still searching for ways to close the gaps in its economic pressure strategy. By tightening loopholes in the oil price cap and targeting LNG transshipment—a growing backdoor for Moscow’s revenue—Brussels is still trying to address real weaknesses that have allowed the Kremlin to keep financing its war machine.

The package was agreed upon despite months of pushback from Hungary and Slovakia, which argued that further restrictions would hurt their domestic energy security. Germany and France championed the measures as a signal of sustained unity behind Ukraine.

However, the drawn-out negotiations also reveal the EU’s internal divides over balancing energy dependence with geopolitical resolve. These divisions could weaken future sanctions rounds if Russia succeeds in exploiting them. The durability of EU unity will remain a key factor in how effectively Western economic statecraft can degrade Russia’s long-term capacity to sustain its war against Ukraine—and whether Moscow recalibrates its strategy in response.

In some ways though, the timing could not be better. Earlier in the July, President Trump pressured Russia to establish a peace deal with Ukraine in 50 days or face 100% tariffs. Russia, who is reportedly discussing the organization of negotiations with Turkey, is facing an economic recession, recruitment struggles, and internal political turmoil. The EU’s new sanctions package could help pressure Moscow into peace negotiations.

Sources: EU Council, EU Council

U.S. Army Awards Epirus $43.5 Million For Leonidas Gen. II Systems

Summary
On 17 July, Epirus announced that the U.S. Army’s Rapid Capabilities and Critical Technologies Office (RCCTO) awarded the company a $43.5 million contract. The contract is for the delivery of two Integrated Fires Protection Capability High-Power Microwave (IFPC-HPM) Generation II systems. The system, also known as Leonidas, uses concentrated microwaves for counter-electronics operations.

Findings
The new system is Epirus’ first major system that is being developed to operate in what the company calls “The Sixth Domain” of warfare:

• GEN II Improvements: The IFPC-HPM GEN II is expected to double the effective range of GEN I, deliver 30% more power, and introduce advanced pulse widths, waveforms, and polarization to defeat a wider array of targets.

  GEN II incorporated soldier feedback from extensive Live-Fire Exercises (LFEs) and Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) operations.

• Role: The new system is being procured to counter new warfighting technologies, specifically commercial drones, drone swarms, and electronic platforms. Regarding small C-UAS operations, the systems could solve the classic air defense dilemma in which launchers must discern which targets to engage due to stockpile limitations and operating speed.

Why This Matters
This contract shows that the Army is moving decisively to field non-kinetic counter-drone solutions at scale. Swarming drones and low-cost UAVs have rapidly shifted from fringe threats to defining features of modern battlefields (think Ukraine to the Middle East) and the U.S. is betting on high-power microwave (HPM) systems to offset this asymmetric challenge.

By investing in a deployable, energy-based counter-electronics capability, the Army aims to protect critical assets without relying solely on expensive interceptors or limited kinetic munitions. If the second-generation systems perform as expected, they could accelerate the adoption of directed energy as a mainstream layer in U.S. air and missile defense architecture, complementing lasers and traditional kinetic options while reducing costs per intercept.

At the same time, rapid fielding and expanded procurement will test industrial readiness and raise questions about how these systems integrate into existing kill chains, rules of engagement, electromagnetic deconfliction, and survivability on the battlefield.

Sources: Epirus

UK, Germany Sign Bilateral Defense Agreement; First Since WWII

Summary
On 16 July, German Chancellor Merz and UK Prime Minister Starmer signed a bilateral defense agreement dubbed “The Kensington Treaty.” The treaty reinforces cooperation on defense, migration control, and economic integration. The pact is being hailed as a major leap in Europe’s commitment, regardless of NATO or EU membership, to provide for its own defense.

Findings

• Defense and Mutual Assistance: The treaty includes a mutual defense clause, pledging military aid if either country is attacked. It is built upon the 2024 Trinity House Agreement commitments.

• Ukraine and Industrials: The leaders announced plans to support Ukraine with long-range strike capabilities. Germany and the UK are also committed to jointly developing the Deep Precision Strike capability within the decade, a 2,000 km precision-strike missile for the UK.
  The pact also expands the industrial cooperation between Germany and the UK, with various German firms investing in the UK economy, and some opening facilities outside of Germany.

• Migration and Law Enforcement: Germany agreed to criminalize the facilitation of English Channel migrant smuggling, enhancing UK–Germany law enforcement cooperation.

• Travel and Cultural Exchange: In lieu of the UK’s exit from the EU, the treaty eases travel and cultural exchanges. German school groups can visit the UK without visas, British passport-holders gain access to German e-gates, and visa requirements are simplified for youth and student exchange.

Why This Matters
The Kensington Treaty is a substantial shift for UK-German relations and a significant strategic evolution for European security. With NATO commitments remaining under scrutiny, the UK and Germany are undertaking a bilateral endeavor to (it seems) jumpstart their ascent to being the industry and defense leaders of Europe.

Geopolitically, it is also a step towards reviving the “E3” coalition (UK, Germany, France) as a credible power axis, setting a precedent for deeper intergovernmental alliances outside EU or NATO frameworks. However, Moscow has already issued warnings of military repercussions if long-range missiles are delivered to Ukraine, highlighting the high-stakes nature of this integration as NATO pushes assets eastwards in preparation for a fight with Russia.

Sources: DW, AP News, Defense News, UK Government, Chatham House

Russia Launches New Military Recruitment Network

Summary
On 17 July, Radio Free Europe reported that Russia has launched a new military recruitment network to expand its manpower base and get troops to the frontlines in Ukraine. RFE/RL reporting and investigations suggest that the new agency, despite offering better incentives, secures recruits to act as expendable “second-rate infantry.” Russia’s attempts to improve recruitment efficiency suggest that large-scale offensive operations and rebuilding efforts will continue.

Findings

• Background: On 21 September 2022, Russia declared partial mobilization of reservists, a decision that has resulted in various “waves” of drafts and activations of new recruits. In December 2023, RFE/RL’s Schemes and Systema revealed that Redut (a private military company) was a recruitment network run by Russia’s GRU intelligence agency.

• Dobrokor: Schemes and Systema reported that in 2025, Russia launched Dobrokor (“Доброкор”), another PMC “volunteer corps” meaning benefits and contracts are not through Russia’s Ministry of Defense.

  Dobrokor’s website lists 27 units that are recruiting for combat operations in Ukraine.
  Data from social media and group chats suggest the Dobrokor units do not uphold promised benefits, with one recruit writing, “I won't be surprised if Dobrokor soon surpasses [in stupidity] the ‘Ministry of Defense.'“
  Schemes and Systema claim casualty rates for volunteer units have significantly increased in 2025.

Why This Matters
Russia’s expansion of recruitment for volunteer units suggests a few things regarding the status of Russia’s military:

• Russia’s military suffers from a leadership crisis (presence of low morale and insubordination).

• The quality of the Russian armed forces is below the standard for a modern professional fighting force.

• Russia wants to continue offensive operations on key Ukrainian towns, cities, infrastructure, and terrain.

What is also an interesting but distant concern is the political effect of raising volunteer companies separate from the military. Let’s say Russia achieves its objectives in Ukraine and ends the war, the Kremlin will soon have to contend with disarming and disbanding volunteer corps, providing payments, benefits, and care, and reconstituting the Russian military to fighting strength, quality, and hierarchy.

It is uncertain if this model will persist in Russia after the war. It is possible that Russia will retain parts of this recruitment system and use volunteer units and PMCs for operations abroad, as the Wagner Group does in Africa and South America.

Sources: Настоящего Время, RFE/RL

End Brief

That concludes this brief.

Thanks for reading!
— Nick